People as Property: On Being a Resource and a Person
Jedediah Purdy

Two approaches to understanding the function of a property regime have
dominated legal scholarship for decades. The first, the economic approach, understands
the function of property regimes as being the allocation of resources. From this point of
view, property rights respond to certain basic facts about the social world. First, people
need resources, from air and water through land and technology, to ideas and the labor of
others, to accomplish much of anything. The world is thus full of desired resources,
things to which people want access. Second, many of these resources are scarce, not in
the sense of being rare, but in that there is competition over them; that is, they are not so
abundant as to be effectively non-exclusive.1 These facts underlie the great gains to
social coordination and productivity from creating property rights.2
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Property law may, of course, operate to produce artificial scarcity, in the sense of competition over the
resource, by introducing exclusivity as a legal matter to “naturally” non-excludable goods. Intellectual
property is the great example of this aspect of the economic function of property law.
2
See, e.g., RICHARD A POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003); Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (1993) (defining the “efficiency thesis” as that “land rules
within a close-knit group evolve so as to minimize its members’ costs”). The influence of economic
analysis on legal scholarship has been so powerful in recent decades that an enormous amount of work on
the dynamics of property regimes has addressed the economic efficiency secured by the coordinated pursuit
of respective self-interest. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003); Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES 359
(2002); David D. Haddock and Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES
545 (2002) (applying Harold Demsetz’s proposal that the development of property rights reflects costbenefit ratios to changes in medieval property rights after the Black Death) ; Saul Levmore, Two Stories
About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES 421 (2002) (arguing that the competing stories
of efficiency and interest-group opportunism leave uncertain whether property regimes reliably secure
efficiency); Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in
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These benefits are conventionally designated gains to static and dynamic
efficiency. Static efficiency concentrates on the present allocation of resources. Clear
property rights enable people to identify the present owners of resources they believe
they can put to a higher-value use, and trade around until all resources are in the hands of
those who most value them.3 Dynamic efficiency concentrates on improving the
productivity of resources over time. Owners are assured of being able to capture the
increase in value from the improvements they make, and thus have incentive to make
these improvements by turning deserts into fields, sand into silicon chips, and words into
sonnets and rap songs.4
The functional description of property as the law of resources has been important
at least since Aristotle, and has been the dominant strain in Anglo-American legal
thought for several centuries.5 With the rise of the law-and-economics perspectives in

the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES 589 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Demsetz Thesis and the
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES 331 (2002) (reviewing Demsetz’s theory while noting its
silence on the question of how institutions take advantage of potential efficiency gains by changing
property rights); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the
Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005) (emphasizing the relevance of political
institutions to the success or failure of property law in changing to take advantage of potential efficiency
gains); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108
YALE L.J. 677 (1999) (applying these concerns to new issues of resource governance).
3
Transaction costs complicate this claim by impeding exchanges that, absent transaction costs, would
produce gains to both parties. The classic statement of the relevance of transaction costs to the design of
property rights is Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Also significant
here are the costs of creating and enforcing property rights, which may be greater than the gains the rights
make possible. The canonical treatment of this issue in modern legal scholarship is Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 1967. As many commentators have noted,
Demsetz gave no account of the governance structure that would translate individual desires for property
rights into explicit, enforceable rights. See, e.g., Merrill, supra n. 2 at 333 (2002).
4
Dynamic efficiency works perfectly only with perfect internalization of all benefits and costs attending
the exercise of one’s property rights – an improbable condition, but one that reality approximates under
some circumstances. A major discussion of the differential relevance of externalities concerns to different
types of resource use appears in Ellickson, supra n. 2 (discussing “large,” “medium,” and “small” events,
for which externalities are, respectively, diminishingly important.)
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recent decades, it has become central to the teaching of property and to property
scholarship.6
This description may be either celebratory or critical, depending what one takes as
the normative purpose of a property regime. A normative commitment to wealthmaximization, perhaps with some side-constraints, has characterized a fair amount of the
commentary on property regimes.7 From this perspective, the static and dynamic benefits
of property rights, allowing for transaction costs and externalities, describe most of the
purpose of property regimes.8 There is, however, a competing strain of thought that takes
the same functional description of property regimes, but addresses their effects on
individuals with scant property who can make a living only by selling their time and
talents, often on unfavorable terms. In American legal law, the canonical expression of
6

On scholarship, see supra n. 2 and works cited therein. For some respectful questions about the uses and limits of economics
in understanding and normatively guiding the law of resources, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175 (2003). Thompson emphasizes that while a maximizing calculus may not in practice

provide a satisfactory comprehensive schedule of social welfare, the analytic tools of economics are
invaluable in the following respects: for designing efficient means to ends however selected, see id. at 179–
86; understanding the perennial threats to effective policy, such as externalities, commons tragedies, and
collective-action problems, see id. at 186–90; and presenting one’s own commitments in a language
generally available to other citizens in the public sphere, see id. at 194–95. For a more theoretical and
playful take on the same issues, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Stoerytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 37-57 (1990) (arguing that the
neoclassical microeconomic account of rational behavior cannot account for the cooperation and modest
altruism that enable property institutions to arise and persist).
7
This is the logic of the economic analysis in the scholarship cited in n. 2, supra. See POSNER, supra n. 2
in particular. Posner’s attempt to vindicate wealth-maximization as a theory of justice has not found much
success, even with the later Posner, but the wealth-maximization criterion remains a default position as
analysts seek to point out where avoidable transaction costs or missed opportunities for propertization
produce deadweight loss, i.e., inhibit transactions that would otherwise take place. For an innovative
application of this analysis to overextended property rights, see Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (arguing
that too many people in post-Soviet Russian held the power to exclude others from property, creating
transaction costs that prevented transfer of the property to higher-value uses). For a discussion of the
doctrinal structure of property law in light of efficiency considerations, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1
(2000) (arguing that the traditional limit on the number of forms property rights may take limits
information costs and enables property markets to achieve allocative (static) efficiency). For Posner’s more
ambitious philosophical project, see RICHARD M. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
8
Ellickson, supra n. 2, provides a classic and powerful encomium to this conception of property rights.
See generally the work cited in nn. 2, 6-7, supra. Outside the legal academy but in the realm of legal
reform, a particularly evocative presentation of the market-enabling power of property rights is HERNANDO
DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM SUCCEEDS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE

39-67 (2001) (outlining the efficiency effects of legally designating the productive aspects of resources as
the objects of fungible and universally transferable right-claims).
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this approach is the work of the legal realist and institutional economist Robert Hale, who
continues to inspire critical property scholars.9 Representatives of this competing
normative tradition characteristically claim an idea of freedom or well-being as their
standard and object that static and dynamic efficiency do not necessarily maximize these
qualities.10
The second major approach to property is the personhood approach. From this
perspective, the function of property law is to express and enforce a specific conception
of personhood: autonomous over a certain sphere of one’s own choices and possessions,
and correspondingly protected in that sphere from the intruding demands of others.11 On
this account, ownership of resources, with the power to exclude others from them, creates
a bulwark against interpersonal invasion and a sphere of autonomous action.12 In some

9

See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 3-34,
385-99 (diagnosing property rights as establishing economic relationships of reciprocal threat and
exploring modes of legal mitigation and equalization of threat). Joseph W. Singer has continued to do
important and theoretically ambitious work in Hale’s vein. See in particular Joseph W. Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 650-51 (1988) (“As Hale tried to teach us, every
transaction takes place against a background of property rights. And the definition, allocation, and
enforcement of those entitlements represent social decisions about the distribution of power and welfare.
No transaction is undertaken outside this sphere of publicly delegated power; the public sphere defines and
allocates the entitlements that are exchanged in the private sphere. At the core of any private action is an
allocation of power determined by the state.”). Duncan Kennedy has also pursued Hale’s line of analysis,
both with explicit acknowledgement and under implicit influence. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of
Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 327 (1991) (reviewing Hale’s account of law
and connecting it with other radical theories of power); The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 209-21 (1979) (laying out an analytics of private-law rights as a mode of
mediating between autonomy and interdependence).
10
Hale himself addresses this issue in a glancing way. See id. at 541-50 (discussing the role of economic
liberty under democratic government). For a discussion of the effort to recast ideas of liberty in light of
critical analytics of legally constituted private power, see BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS
MOVEMENT 37-70 (1998) (describing the progressive thought of T.H. Green, John Dewey, John Stuart
Mill, and others). Nobel Economist Amartya Sen has developed a capabilities-oriented account of welfare
economics in part because of the recognition that static conceptions of efficiency bear only minimally on
the actual condition of life enjoyed by those who participate in the allocation of resources to their highestvalue users. I briefly introduce Sen’s account in Part IV.A.1, infra.
11
The classic discussion of the personhood perspective is in Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.957 (1982) (introducing the terminology of personhood to American legal
debate through a discussion of legal doctrine and Hegel’s theory of identity). Because I distinguish among
several quite distinct perspectives on the personhood approach, of which Radin’s is one, I present their
representatives respectively in the following footnotes rather than lump them together here.
12
See id. and nn. 13-15, infra.
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versions, the most important aspect of this function is self-ownership, the power to
dispose of one’s person and time freely and a protection against outright ownership by
others.13 Others place more stress on self-ownership as synecdoche, an aspect of
property rights that expresses the logic or essence of the whole scheme of private
property, and indeed of rights-holding itself.14 Still others regard ownership as filling out
and enriching identity by enabling owners to identify with and express themselves
through the external objects they control.15
The description of property rights as based in personhood, like that of property
rights as oriented resource governance, is compatible with more than one normative
13

For writers from this perspective, property is the keystone of negative liberty, the “guardian of every
other right” that gives substance and certainty to the immunity against interference. See James W. Ely, The
Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights 26 (Oxford 1998) (describing
how “the protection of property ownership was an integral part of the American effort to fashion
constitutional limits on governmental authority”). See also Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (Knopf
1999) (arguing that property is a necessary prerequisite for political liberty); Richard A. Epstein, Takings:
Private Property and the Eminent Domain (Harvard 1985) (arguing in favor of an absolutist conception of
property rights, where such rights include exclusive use, disposition, and full alienability). As I discuss
particularly in Part II, infra, this perspective emerges historically from the Free Labor politics of the
nineteenth century, but in its property-absolutist version is something of a caricature of that rich and
socially informed idea of the importance of self-ownership.
14
Carol Rose calls this the “symbolic argument” for the importance of property rights. See Carol M. Rose,
Property as the Keystone Right? 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 349-51 (1996). Margaret Jane Radin’s
argument that treating certain kinds of resources as property creates an instrumental subject-object
relationship to them is a critical version of this argument. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (discussing the moral-psychological effects of thinking of, e.g., organs
and human beings as commodities). A similar argument that goes more to the self-conception of the
property-holder than to her view of the objects she may hold is JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN
FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 207-11 (describing “the distorted lens of property” (1992). For a
more positive and traditional view of ownership as synecdoche for autonomy, see 4 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *23 (12th ed. 1873) (1823). Kent explains, “An estate of freehold . . .
. denoted anciently an estate held by a freeman, independently of the mere will and caprice of the feudal
lord.” He continues, “By the ancient law, a freehold interest conferred upon the owner a variety of valuable
rights and privileges. He became a suitor of the courts, and the judge in the capacity of a juror; he was
entitled to vote for members of Parliament, and to defend his title to the land . . . and he had a right to call
in the aid of the reversioner or remainderman, when the inheritance was demanded. These rights gave him
importance and dignity as a freeholder.” Id. at *24.
15
Far and away the outstanding piece in this vein remains Radin, supra n. 11. She has developed aspects
of the personhood theme, in conjunction with the market-inalienability theme, in MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN BODY
PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 54-101 (1996) (arguing for a capabilities-oriented conception of
personhood that concentrates on whether property rights facilitate the realization of a full complement of
human potential, a condition Radin styles flourishing. This criterion falls close to the argument I have
made in Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New
Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273 (2005).
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evaluation. The major strain of the personhood approach has praised property rights as
supportive of freedom.16 Another school, particularly associated with Jennifer Nedelsky,
has argued that the conception of personhood that property rights promote is normatively
unattractive: too rigidly bounded, too individualistic, and correspondingly obtuse to the
extent and importance of human interdependence.17 A third, identified with Margaret
Jane Radin, takes a pluralist approach, arguing that property rights aimed at allocating
resources in market-efficient ways are perfectly appropriate for resources that we in fact
value chiefly as commodities, but that certain possessions, such as the home, the body,
and objects with intimate associations, have value more closely related to the identity of
the person who owns them.18 On this account, governing those goods as market
resources distorts and sometimes violates their importance to personhood and may
devalue personhood itself.19
16

See n. 13, supra.
See n. 14, supra. This critical perspective has tended to accompany an emphasis on the importance of
interdependence in human life, and on its necessity for any adequate conception of well-being. See, e.g.,
Singer, supra n. 9. See also Eduardo Penalver, Property as Entrance (forthcoming U. VA. L. REV. (2006)
(arguing that libertarian conceptions of the importance of property neglect our need for human relationships
and social participation, which property rights facilitate and which should be the normative measure of
property regimes).
18
See n. 15, supra.
19
See id. For some applications of this argument to specific legal and policy questions, see Note, The Price
of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 Harv L Rev 689 (2003)
(surveying, in particular, arguments concerned with the devaluation of commodified goods and
relationships, and proposing that the devaluation arises less from the designation of the goods as
commodities than from the character of the consequent transactions, in which the fungibility of values is
assumed); Margaret Jane Radin, Conceiving a Code for Creation: The Legal Debate Surrounding Human
Cloning, 53 Hastings L J 1123, 1126 (2002):
We want the legal system to make a commitment to an ideal of noncommodification of love, family,
and other commitments close to ourselves. . . . Some people think that if we start talking about children
as things we own, and about one as being fungible with the other, and we expect them to maximize our
pleasure in life, we might start actually trading them one day.
Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Project and the Commodification of the
Self, 14 Issues L & Med 147, 151–52 (1998) (arguing that regarding the self as a bundle of alienable
resources stunts the ability to discern noneconomic value in persons); David E. Jefferies, The Body as
Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud 621, 655 (1998)
(considering the argument that a market in organs will reduce altruism); Norman W. Spaulding,
Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 Stan
Envir L J 293, 311–13 (1997) (considering the psychological experiences of “commodity fetishism” and
“alienation” as consequences of commodification). See also Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology, 109 Yale L J 1135, 1146–47 (2000) (arguing that the use of apologies as
bargaining chips in settlement negotiation drains a “moral process” of meaning by making it a “market
trade”).
17
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This article achieves a partial reconciliation of these two approaches to property
law. My argument is not that the two are “closer than they think” or “getting at the same
thing,” for they are not: they are different. It is an important part of my argument,
however, that the two are not just incommensurably distinct approaches. Rather, they
describe inextricably entwined aspects of property law. Both are present in any property
regime. Moreover, each sets limits on the other, so that any conception of property as the
law of resources will imply some features of a conception of personhood, and viceversa.20
The relationship is in important part a product of legal choices. The key terms of
the competing schools are not self-defining. There is no a-historical, context-free
meaning of “personhood.”21 Neither is there any timeless and placeless definition of

20

A problem may seem to arise here. In our market regime, the general prohibition on recruitment through
threat of violence is a point of criminal law and the ban on slavery a tenet of constitutional law. What does
it mean to set these up as essential contrasts to market means of recruitment in an account of property law?
This concern rests on a confusion of the present boundaries of property law with the “nature” of property If
it is helpful to describe property law as governing the terms of recruitment for cooperative activity, then it
is unsurprising that actions (such as the threat of violence) and legal relationships (such as slavery) that
have been categorically excluded from such recruitment should no longer stand as part of property law, but
should instead become part of the “outside of property,” law that, by prohibition on certain acts or
relationships, defines how property rights cannot come about or transactions be consummated, and which
rights may not be exchanged. For an excellent discussion of the perennial tendency to lose track of the
two-sided character of any legal definition – what it takes in and what it shuts out – as mutually constitutive
of the domain governed by the definition, see James Boyle, The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 1 (2003). At the point of historical origin, however, it was clear that the abolition of
slavery and the designation of labor power as personal property alienable only on certain terms (at retail
rather than wholesale, as it were) that defined the triumph of the Free Labor movement were significant
revisions in the law of property itself. Any particular property regime, then, may be diagnosed by reference
to both its circumstances and its rules of recruitment – in sum, by the terms of recruitment it sets up for
engaging others in one’s projects.
21
Two of the most important and influential treatments of this theme are the very different histories of
Charles Taylor and Michel Foucault. Taylor, following G.W.F. Hegel in the broadest sense, describes the
development in Western thought of an increasingly “deep” and complex idea of the human being as a
bearer of interests, rights, personality, and even a form of subjective (but not arbitrary) truth. The great
statement of this project is CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
(1989). Many of the same themes recur – with greater attention to political and social thought alongside
philosophical, religious, and cultural conceptions of personality – in a smaller and more accessible work,
CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004). Foucault’s work takes a very different tack from
Taylor’s, attending not to ideas about personality, but instead to the institutional practices, the
“disciplines,” in which modern personality is formed, with special attention to those that are “normative” in
the sense of embodying their workings in the persons who inhabit them. See MICHEL FOUCAULT,

7

what counts as a resource.22 In its approach to both resources and personhood, therefore,
a legal system does not simply respond to facts about the world that precede the
formulations of law – although, of course, it also does that.23 Rather, law’s designation
of certain things as resources and certain qualities in people as constitutive of personhood
helps to define both qualities.
My argument is made up of three complementary strands: doctrine, history, and
theory. After sketching how the two dimensions of property law interact and depend on
each other, I carry the analysis through a contrast between property systems based on
slavery or feudal relations, on the one hand, and those based on universal self-ownership,
or “free labor,” on the other. In Part I, I examine two clusters of doctrinal problems
dealing with the terms of labor discipline in antebellum slave states and in post-Civil War
Free Labor jurisprudence. I argue that in each case, courts struggle to define a
(Alan Sheridan, trans.) (1977). Late in his life, Foucault
took a tack that in some ways brought him nearer Taylor, developing a new interest in the way that selfunderstanding gave ethical shape to people’s relations to their own bodies and their intimate dealings with
others. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 2 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USES OF PLEASURE (Robert Hurley,
trans.) (1985). Although less celebrated in recent scholarship, two other works on the historical
development of ideas of dignity and freedom are particularly valuable for their attention to the relationship
of these ideas to economic life, and are in general exceptionally rich. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, 1
FREEDOM: FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE (1991) (arguing that ideas of freedom
developed in the West out a series of contrasts with slavery, which reveal the essential interdependence
between freedom and the limits imposed by our need for and vulnerability to others); BARRINGTON MOORE,
JR., INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT (1978) (asking how, historically, inequality
and oppression have come to be recognized as “injustice” and those subjected to them have newly
conceived of themselves as competent and entitled to resist and demand a reform of the social order that
imposes those conditions).
22
For discussions of exogenous changes in the value of resources and their relationship to the development
of property rights, see Demsetz, supra n. 3 (discussing the effect on rights in land and hunting among
Native Americans of the rise of the European market for beaver pelts); Liebcap & Smith, supra n. 2 (on
exogenous changes in the value of petroleum resources as a fossil-fuel-based economy arose); Carol M.
Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261
(1990) (exploring changes in water rights that emerged as water became an energy-producing resource with
the rise of mills in New England). A classic study treating the commodification of labor and reshaping of
social life along market lines as a partly endogenous change is Karl Polanyi, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1965). Another
methodologically complex view attentive both to changes in the logic of resources with the rise of
industrial capitalism and to the internal workings of legal doctrine is MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) (describing private law as changing,
particularly in its conception of property, to accommodate and facilitate a market-enabling instrumental
view of resources).
23
See Demsetz, supra n. 3; Liebcap & Smith, supra n. 2; Rose, supra n. 22.
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
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relationship between two intertwined features of human beings: their character as
resources and their personhood. In Part II, I examine the debates in political economy
and moral psychology that drove the critique of slave relations and the vindication and
critique of Free Labor economies. I show that these debates fill out the conceptual
problem of the doctrinal history by revealing what contemporaries thought was at stake in
the choice of property systems. In Part III, I present an analytic account of the
relationship between serving as a resource and standing as a person: I argue that human
beings’ dependence on one another in nearly all our projects means that we perennially
need to recruit others to our undertakings. The law’s mediation of resource and
personhood is thus essential to setting up the terms of recruitment, the rules and
bargaining positions that structure our reciprocal recruitment. In Part IV, I apply this
analysis normatively, considering two applications at opposite poles of social and
technological development: the production of culture and knowledge in a digital age and
the entrance of Indian women into the labor market. Both examples show that property
law benefits human freed by directing interpersonal recruitment toward relative
reciprocity rather than hierarchy.

I. Personhood and Property in Slave Relations and Labor Markets
A. “Inherent in the Relationship”: People as Resources in American Slavery
Antebellum courts wrestled with the doctrinal consequences of defining one
human being as the property of another.24 The question was vexed because it was
24

The great study of the political and legal struggle over slavery in the Anglo-American world is DAVID
(1975). Davis addresses the
status of slavery under law, with special attention to moments where legal distinctions came under pressure,
either through the conjunction of property and personhood in a single human being or through the conflict
of laws between free and slave jurisdictions. See id. at 469-522. Also valuable on these themes is
BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823

EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA

(1975). Morgan argues that slavery arose in part in response to the challenge of maintaining labor
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inescapable that designating someone as property did not erase her humanity as a matter
of fact; yet the designation was plainly incompatible with the recognition of legal
personhood, even in a time when that category was considerably more differentiated (by
gender, for instance) than it now is.25 Courts thus had to determine in what respects
slaves were to be treated as property, and in what respects as persons – and what each of
those categories meant.
Courts across several decades and many jurisdictions formulated the problem as
one of drawing a line between personhood and property. “In expounding [the] law,”
Chief Justice Taney wrote while riding circuit in Virginia in 1859, “we must not lose
sight of the twofold character which belongs to the slave. He is a person, and also
property.”26 “The laws of Georgia … recognize the negro as a man, whilst they hold him
property,” observed that state’s supreme court in 1851. 27 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi remarked, “In some respects, slaves may be considered as chattels, but in
others, they are regarded as men.”28

discipline in a land of abundant resources. See id. at 295-98. On political and constitutional debates in the
years just preceding the Civil War, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY:THE GREAT BATTLE
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996). Adrienne Davis has given a penetrating study of the private-law
regulation of sexual intimacy between masters and slaves, with particular attention to masters’ efforts to
leave property by testament to women who had been both their intimates and their property. See Adrienne
D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999).
25

On these issues, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179-201 (1973) (on the law
of status in nineteenth-century America, with particular attention to the propertyless, women, and slaves);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11 – 94 (1992) (describing social
hierarchy and its intersection with political membership and authority in colonial America); ROGERS M.
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 137-242 (1997) (describing
citizenship and status between the adoption of the Constitution and the Dred Scott decision).
26
United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (1859).
27
Neal v. Farmer, 1851 WL 1474 at *16 (9 Ga. 555).
28
State v. Isaac Jones, 1820 WL 1413 at *1 (1 Miss. 83). Sometimes, however, the matter was put so as to
suggest no legal salience in the slave’s humanity. Thus the Kentucky Court of Appeals opined that,
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The problem of setting this boundary arose when legal dimensions of personhood
came into conflict with the legal incidents of property. Justice Taney’s pronouncement in
State v. Amy, for instance, concerned a claim by a slaveholder that imprisonment of his
slave for pilfering from a post office constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment:
although she was criminally liable as a legal person, her status as his property made her
imprisonment a deprivation of his ownership claim.29 In most cases, however, the
problem arose from violence against slaves: the question was whether the violence at
issue crossed lines of immunity which the slave enjoyed under her aspect as a legal
person, or instead fell within the owner’s power to manage his property.30 The issue was
particularly acute in labor discipline: how far could a master go in coercively extracting a
slave’s labor? The question went directly to the slave’s character as a value-producing
resource, which here came directly into conflict with the bodily integrity, dignity, and
autonomy of personhood.
Some judges took the attitude that the conflict was illusory or, at worst, an
unnecessary product of masters’ overreaching: there was no inherent conflict between
property and personhood. The model of this approach was a dissent in Commonwealth v.
Turner, argued before the General Court of Virginia in 1827. The majority upheld a
master’s demurral to an indictment “for cruelly beating his own slave.”31 The majority
29

See supra n. __. Taney ruled that slaves were regarded as legal persons for purposes of enforcing
criminal law against them, and that where the government’s bodily expropriation of a slave was with
respect to her as a legal person, the protection of property under the Fifth Amendment was not triggered.
Similarly, Jarman v. Patterson, supra n. __, dealt with a claim by a master that a law entitling the city of
Richmond to jail at his expense a slave found unattended. The court ruled that the statute was a reasonable
regulation of property, not in excess of the power “of compelling the owners of such property, so to use it
as not to injure and annoy the rights or repose of others.” Id. at *4.
30
In State v. Isaac, supra n. __, the issue was whether it was possible to commit common-law murder
against a slave; the court found that it was, reasoning in part that “a slave may commit murder and be
punished with death; why then is it not murder to kill a slave?” Id. at *1. In Neal v. Farmer, supra n. __,
the court found by contrast that the killing of a slave was not a felony under the common law, as the slave
relationship was not recognized in common law and thus was not subject to common-law regulation. See
id. at *16.
31
Commonwealth v. Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at *1 (26 Va. 678).
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reasoned from the existence of a state statute, passed in 1788, which forbade the killing
of a slave as of a freeman.32 That statute replaced two far more permissive laws, a 1669
statute exculpating any master “for killing his slave under correction for resistance” and a
1723 statute extending the same immunity to a master killing a slave “for any offence
whatever.”33 Noting that the common law had not recognized and thus not regulated the
slave relationship, the court reasoned that the 1788 statute must represent the extent of
the law’s protection of slaves from their masters’ discipline, and that to enforce broader
common-law restrictions on the master would be judicial overreach.34
In dissent, Judge Brockenbrough argued that the common law contained
principles of labor discipline that courts could legitimately extend to reconcile the two
dimensions of slave status. “The slave was not only a thing, but a person,” he wrote,
“and this well-known distinction would extend its protection to the slave as a person,
except so far as the application of it conflicted with the enjoyment of the slave as a
thing.”35 Brockenbrough proposed that this formula was simply an application to the
slave relationship of the standard that the common law imposed on the disciplinary
actions of other status superiors against their subordinates, such parent to child, tutor to
pupil, and, above all, master to servant: discipline must fall within “bounds of due
moderation.”36 In Brockenbrough’s formula, permissible discipline included “every
power which was necessary to enable the master to use his property,” including sale of
the slave and “correction for disobedience.”37 Severe beatings, however, were as a matter
of law unnecessary to labor discipline and thus outside the “bounds of due moderation.”

32

See id. at *5.
Id. at *4-5.
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See id.
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Id. at *5.
37
Id. at *6.
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Because permissible discipline was restricted to what was necessary to manage people in
their status as things, the law could regard the slave as a person in judging such
overreaching punishment, and could this extend the protection of the criminal common
law. On this reasoning, Brackenbrough satisfied himself that he could “see no
incompatibility between this degree of protection [of the slave’s legal personhood] and
the full enjoyment of the [master’s] right of property.”38
The Tennessee Supreme Court took a view similar to Brackenbrough’s in James
v. Carper, an 1857 trespass action by a master against a man who had rented his slave,
then beaten the slave severely upon false allegations that he had stolen money from a
white transient in the neighborhood.39 The defendant argued that the master’s inherent
right to punish the slave had traveled with his leasing of the slave, and the trial court
accepted this view.40 The Supreme Court disagreed, opining that the master’s general
right of punishment against the slave was among “certain peculiar rights” that attached
inherently “[t]o this, as to the various other domestic relations.”41 The rights of such
status-based relationships were not transferable by a contract for services.42 The renter
was thus liable to the master for harm to the slave.
The court did, however, undertake its own inquiry into the problem of labor
discipline and slavery. This inquiry followed the logic of Brockenbrough’s proposal to
reconcile personhood and property status by limiting punishment to acts necessary for the
management of property. Someone who rented a slave, the court noted, “must of
38

Id.
James v. Carper, 1857 WL 2493 (Tenn.) (36 Tenn. 397). The court was not clear on its view of the scope
of the master’s power to punish a slave, noting that a parent possessed of the status based “paternal power
… may not excess the bounds of moderation,” but also suggesting “for the sake of argument, that the
owner of the slave, in virtue of his absolute right of property, might take the law into his own hands, and
avenge the crime committed by the slave without appeal to the law.” Id. at *2-3. The precise bounds of the
master’s power were not, of course, at issue in the case.
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necessity be regarded as possessing the right to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on
the slave, for insubordination, disobedience of lawful commands, wanton misconduct, or
insolent behavior.”43 Such corporal punishment was not status-based in the same sense
as the inherent power to punish of the master, but was governed functionally by the
requirements of extracting labor from an unfree human being. The court acknowledged
the vagueness of this power and its dependence on the circumstances of any particular act
of discipline, noting that “the hirer must always, at his peril, be able to show that there
existed reasonable ground for the chastisement, and that it did not, either in the extent or
manner of it, exceed the bounds of moderate correction.”44 Moderation was, of course,
relative to the task of compelling a human being to conduct himself as property by
yielding up whatever of value he could produce, and surrendering his body to punitive
coercion if he failed or declined to do so.
Other courts, while equally committed to the legality of slavery, regarded the
conciliatory approach as a pleasant delusion. As they analyzed the slave relationship, the
brutality inherent in extracting unfree labor necessarily overwhelmed any guarantees of
personhood in the slave. In one of the most mercilessly reasoned slavery cases, State v.
Mann,45 a North Carolinian shot and wounded a slave whom he had rented for one year,
as she fled after he chastised her for “some small offence.”46 Unlike the court in James,
Justice Ruffin in Mann held that a renter of a slave had exactly the same power of labor
discipline as a master.47 This was so because the master’s power was not part of
“domestic relations,” such as parent-child and master-apprentice ties, but a legally unique
relationship governed entirely by the functional requirements of labor discipline.
43
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Because those requirements were the same for the renter as for the master, labor
discipline had the same bounds in both situations.48
Ruffin’s rejection of the domestic-relations analogy was critical to leaving behind
the conciliatory approach. The several categories of status-constituting domestic
relations had as their purpose the improvement and eventual emancipation of the
dependent party, as with children, or an idea of mutual advantage and obligation, as with
servants.49 “With slavery it is far otherwise,” Ruffin wrote.50 The end is the profit of the
master, his security and the public safety.”51 The slave should be regarded as purely
instrumental to these ends. Put differently, Justice Ruffin defined the question of the
master’s authority as one entirely of resource management.
The slave presented a uniquely difficult problem in these terms, because he was a
conscious agent who, although legally unfree, retained free will. As a slave, denied any
share of what he produced, he had no incentive to work except bare survival. He was,
Ruffin observed, “doomed … to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to
make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits.”52 The master faced
a particular challenge in extracting productive labor from a human being in that position.
Where a laborer has no affirmative incentive to work, because no prospect of improving
his situation, “obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body.
There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master
must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect.”53 The slave’s only
incentive was avoiding cruel treatment. That cruelty had to be potentially unbounded,
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because anything less would give the slave a sticking point, where he might choose a
known measure of suffering over relentless exploitation with no reward. Such a
“discipline” was thus “inherent in the relation of master and slave,” not because of the
relationship’s status quality – the sense in which Brockenbrough had identified
“inherent” terms in the relationship – but because of the necessities of disciplining unfree
labor. The doctrinal result was a massive effacement of any legal personhood in the
slave, justified as the functional requirement of rendering the slave valuable as property.54
In the antebellum slave cases, then, we find the concerns of both branches of
property thought interwoven: personhood and resources entwined in single bodies of law,
in single cases, even in the bodies of the slaves themselves, who stand in some respects as
legal persons, in others as mere resources for the value-maximizing use of their owners.
The courts in these cases struggled to understand the relationship between these two
aspects of single entities: human beings as persons, with responsibilities, aims, and
immunities of their own, and human beings simultaneously as resources, whose efficient
use implied powers of control in those whose property they were. They found
consistently that the definition of the one category – the slave’s character as a resource –
implied some specific content for the other category, the slave’s character as a person.
Whether the master’s power was notionally limitless or bounded by a principle of
“moderation,” it took its contours, and the slave’s personhood conversely took its limits,
from the requirements of exploiting a resource that possessed the powers of reason and
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A nice formulation of the erasure of slaves’ legal personhood comes in Ruffin’s opinion: “The slave, to
remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his master; that his power is in no
instance, usurped; but is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God.” Id. at *3. A bit
later, Ruffin concluded, “this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the
master, and the public tranquility, greatly dependent upon their subordination.”
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choice.55 By the reciprocal logic, to begin with a stronger notion of the slave’s
personhood than antebellum courts followed would have negated the possibility of the
slave relationship in the dimension of resources. These cases show that an essential task
of the law is to define the boundary between the aspects in which slaves are persons and
the aspects in which they are resources, thus defining certain incursions on others as
violations of personhood, others as simple exercises in resource use. There is no
separating the logic of resources from the logic of personhood in these cases.

B. Labor Discipline under Free Labor
1. The Free-Labor Formula
The master-slave relationship was decisively erased by the Thirteenth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process became, in the
decades after the Civil War, the keystone of a new jurisprudential account of the
relationship between personhood and property. This new relationship expressed what
was often called the Free Labor idea of personhood, property, and social life.56 The
organizing principle of this idea was a property rule: energy, time, and talent – in a word,
labor – were defined as inherently the property of the person in whose body they
resided.57 They were alienable, but only, as it were, at retail, not wholesale.58 One could
55

A particularly explicit reflection on this difficulty came in Jarman v. Patterson, supra n. __ at *4. There
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, considering the extent of the state’s police power to regulate property in
slaves, observed: “If the use of any property can … be restrained, certainly that of slaves needs it more than
any other; for to the power of locomotion they add the design and continuance of human intellect, and of
course are more capable than other animals to injure and annoy society.”
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SeeERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 1-37 (1970) (describing the premises and social
vision of free labor ideology). For an exemplary contemporary statement of the outlook, see ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, in LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 233-37 (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed.) (1992) (1859) (contending for the dignity of labor
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See FONER, FREE LABOR at 11-13, 40-51 (describing the basic tenets of Free Labor thought and its stark
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sell one’s time and energy, or the products of one’s labor; but one could not sell oneself
into a condition of servitude, in which the dispensation and products of one’s labor
belonged categorically (and, usually, indefinitely) to another.59 It followed that all labor
relations were bounded in principle by the right of exit: as the ultimate owner of his
labor, a worker could take it elsewhere when presented with a better bargain or mired in
an intolerable arrangement.
Free Labor lifted the threat to survival or bodily integrity that had been the
backdrop of the slave-owner’s prerogative.60 The right of exit would have been
meaningless if the other party could answer the threat of exit with overt coercion.
Although the worker might be seriously constrained in her alternatives, she could not be

ultimate origin in John Locke’s famous declaration, “[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This
no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body and the Work of his Hands … are properly
his.” JOHN LOCKE, Bk. V, sec. 27, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Cambridge ed., Peter Laslett, ed., 1988) (1689). It had its culmination in the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude … shall exist
within the United States.” CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AM. XIII.
58
See FONER, supra n. 57 and other works cited in that note. This is a corollary of the prohibition on
ownership outright of another’s labor power.
59
See id.
60
The defenders of slavery did not accept that it was best characterized as an institution founded on a
continuing, absolute power of the master over the slave. The argument in Somerset v. Stewart addressed
this issue specifically, through an appeal to the idea of slavery as regulated institution consonant with the
general spirit of ordered liberty, and also macabre humor that must have drawn on the racist fears and
taboos of the listeners:
If it were necessary to the idea and the existence of James Somerset [the slave], that his master,
even here [in England], might kill, nay, might eat him, might sell living or dead … this, how high
soever my ideas may be of the duty of my profession, is what I should decline pretty much to
defend or assert … I should only speak of it to testify my contempt and abhorrence. But this is
what at present I am not at all concerned in; unless Captain Knowles, or Mr. Stewart, have killed
or eat him. Freedom has been asserted as a natural right, and therefore unalienable and
unrestrainable; there is perhaps no branch of this right, but in some at all times [sic], and in all
places at different times, has been restrained: nor could society otherwise be conceived to exist.
Sometset v. Stewart at 505.
Naturally, Justice Ruffin’s opinions and the others discussed in Part I.A support a contrary view.
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kept in place by the threat of any consequence more severe than denial of her part of the
bargain she had struck with her present employer.61
Free Labor thought thus solved on its face the paradox of slavery jurisprudence:
how to regard a human being as both a person and an object of property. The Free Labor
solution sharply distinguished personhood from the property of others, by making the
slave relationship impossible and thus immunity from being owned a feature of
personhood under the Constitution of the United States. By the same token, the Free
Labor solution assimilated property in oneself to personhood: self-ownership became a
feature of individual legal identity under the Constitution. The individual’s ultimate and
absolute claim on his own productive capacity, his own aspect as a resource, was as
complete as the master’s claim on the slave’s body had been in Ruffin’s opinion.
This solution, however, did not dissolve the problem we have been exploring: the
relationship between a human being’s character as a person and her character as a
resource. Rather, the problem shifted, still under the general rubric of labor discipline.
In its new version, the question came to be: on what terms can you extract labor from
another person, allowing that she owns herself? The question moved from addressing
the limits of overt coercion between a free master and an unfree slave to the limits of
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A fascinating anxiety about the terms of recruitment and command emerges in the oral arguments of the
pro-slavery side in Somerset v. Stewart. The lawyer Mr. Dunning imagines that, if the slave James
Somerset is released, servants will no longer accept orders from their masters:
It would be a great surprise, and some inconvenience, if a foreigner bringing over a servant, as
soon as he got hither [to England], must take care of his carriage, his horse, and himself, in
whatever method he might have the luck to invent. He must find his way to London on foot. He
tells his servant, Do this; the servant replies, Before I do it, I think fit to inform you, sir, the first
step on this happy land sets all men on a perfect level; you are just as much obliged to obey my
commands. Thus neither superior nor inferior, both go without their dinner.
Somerset v. Stewart at 506.

The abolition of the relationship of prerogative is here envisioned as a breakdown in the means of
social coordination as such, so that the loss of hierarchy verges on the loss of social control. It is
surprising that Dunning did not envision the newly licentious servant proposing to eat his former master to
make up the lack of dinner.
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bargaining among free persons. In seeking to hire another, what may you demand of her,
what may you offer her, and how may you threaten her to get the arrangement you
prefer?

Where will the law draw the line between the protections and powers of

personhood and the transfer and disposal of resources, where both inhere in the same
human being?

2. “A real equality of right”? Personhood and Resources in the Lochner era
I explore two stands of Free Labor jurisprudence, one rooted in the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution, the other in the common law of labor relations.
Although the constitutional strand is most famously associated with Lochner v. New
York,62 the “right of contract”63 that grounded Justice Peckham’s opinion striking down
New York’s maximum-hours statute for bakers was derived from constitutional text in
another case, Holden v. Hardy.64 There, Justice Brewer began his analysis with the
observation that “due process of law” in the Anglo-American tradition included the
principle that property, “or right to property, shall [not] be taken for the benefit of
another, or for the benefit of the state, without compensation.”65 He then proposed a
corollary of that principle: if the due process clause protects existing property rights, it
must also protect the right to acquire property. A prohibition on this right “would also be
obnoxious to the same provision,”66 for it would permanently exclude those who
presently lack property from all the benefits of ownership. In a third step, Justice Brewe
derived the right to contract from the right to acquire property: “as property can only be
legally acquired, as between living persons, by contract, a general prohibition against
62
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entering into contracts with respect to property, or having as their object the acquisition
of property, would be equally invalid.”67 The right to contract was therefore derived, at
two stages’ remove, from the due process clause’s protection of property rights. Two
essential presuppositions marked this reasoning. The first was that the right to property,
including ownership of one’s own labor, was not mainly a right to static enjoyment of
what one already has. Rather, property rights were instrumental to participation in a
world of free exchange and self-betterment, so that merely to protect existing property
claims without setting into motion the churn of contractual exchange would be to
obliterate the social purposes of property: mobility and opportunity.68 The second
presupposition was the core of Free Labor thought: the property governed by this
rationale included the labor power of individuals. Legal personhood was marked by the
power to acquire and alienate property, including labor itself, which courts rendered as
the right of contract. In this way freedom of contract became the keystone right in the
Free Labor account of self-ownership: it was, in effect, the power of alienation over the
property one held in oneself.
This right, though, was qualified by two considerations. One, protection of the
health and welfare of certain classes of workers, had what might today seem a counterintuitive basis: that people were state resources, and the demands of private industry
must not degrade them past being able to reproduce and fight wars – two functions a state
was thought to require of its citizens. Thus in Holden, the Court wrote that even though a
miner might consent to work until his health broke, “The state still retains an interest in
his welfare, however reckless he may be … when the individual health, safety, and

67
68

Id.
Chancellor Kent would be a good one to quote here; and maybe some material from Foner.
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welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.”69 Dissenting in Lochner,
Justice Harlan defended New York’s statute on the grounds that long hours of work “may
endanger the health and shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing their
physical and mental capacity to serve the state[.]”70 In Muller v. Oregon, upholding a
maximum-hours law for women employees, Justice Brewer wrote that, “as healthy
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of a woman becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race,” that is, women must be healthy enough to bear children71 Oregon’s maximumhours law was thus “not imposed solely for [women’s] benefit, but also largely for the
benefit of all.”72 Although I will not pursue this theme further in this article, it
represented an important element of thought about the relationship between selfownership and the claims of others on the resource of one’s body.
The second consideration returns us to the theme of the slavery cases: the limits of
permissible labor discipline. Free Labor solved this question notionally by enshrining
self-ownership, so that the terms of labor were always the products of free agreement,
never coerced in the manner of slave relations. The difficulty was that parties reached
their free agreements always in light of (1) the extent and intensity of their need and (2)
the other options open to them. Depending on these factors, their decision “freely” to
accept any specific set of terms could be either a choice among meaningful alternatives or
an empty choice between a single tolerable option and privation. It was explicit that the
slave-owner’s offer to his slave was a Hobson’s choice – obey or be punished, with the
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legal boundaries of punishment set by the necessities of labor discipline.73 Free Labor
repudiated this arrangement; but when did exigent circumstances leave the “free”
laborer’s decision so constrained that his contract was not a product of genuinely free
choice, but instead brought him too near the abject position of the slave?
This was a major concern of the pro-regulatory opinion in Holden v. Hardy,
where Justice Brewer laid out the problem of unequal bargaining power:
[T]he proprietors of these establishments [mines and smelters] and their
[employees] do not stand on an equality, and … their interests are, to a certain
extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as
possible from their employes [sic], while the latter are often induced by the fear of
discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would
pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength. In other words, the
proprietors lay down the rules, and the laborers are practically constrained to obey
them. In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and the legislature may
properly interpose its authority.74
The essential threat of the employer was to invoke Brewer’s “fear of discharge,”
withdrawing the employee’s opportunity to work in the employer’s enterprise. Of course,
firing was enshrined in the logic of Free Labor. The freedom of exit, the employee’s
power to quit, marked an essential distinction between a free laborer and a slave, and the
power to fire was a corollary of the power to quit. The critical question was how hard a
bargain the threat could induce an employee to accept. That, in turn, was a function of
the employee’s alternatives: only a worker with a bleak set of options would take a grim
offer rather than leave.
The most aggressive application of the idea that hard circumstances could
undercut free choice was also the instance likely to strike the modern eye as most
unpalatable: the sex-based defense of the maximum-hours law for women in Muller.
Justice Brewer noted that the women of Oregon had been granted “equal contractual and
73
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personal rights with men,” and thus that in economic life “they stand on the same plane
as the other sex.”75 This formally equal liberty, however, did not mean that the logic of
Free Labor jurisprudence applied alike to men and women. On the assumption that
women were less physically able than men, and thus at a competitive disadvantage in the
labor market, the Court found that “from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an
independent position in life, [women are] not upon an equality.”76 Rather, formal liberty
took its substance – choice among meaningful alternatives – only “where some
legislation to protect her” was provided “to secure a real equality of right.”77 The
distinction between formal equality and “a real equality of right” bespoke the line Free
Labor courts sought to draw between the circumstances in which labor agreements
expressed free choice and those in which they reflected choice among such straitened
alternatives that “real equality” gave way to unjust exploitation.

3. “Fear of Losing His Place”: Free Bargaining and Coercion at Common Law
The starkest commitment to the employer’s power to extract concessions with the
threat of firing came not in the substantive due process of Lochner-era jurisprudence, but
in a contemporaneous line of Massachusetts Supreme Court decisions. Those cases
addressed employees’ injuries in hazardous workplaces where they had remained, after
objecting to a manifest risk, only because the certainty of firing was worse than the
probability of being hurt. Massachusetts applied a common-law version of Free Labor
principles, holding that when employees accepted a hard bargain they ratified all its
consequences, however unpalatable the alternatives they faced. Oliver Wendell Holmes,
then chief justice of the Massachusetts Court, gave the classic statement of this doctrine
75
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in Lamson v. American Ax & Tool,78 just five years before his dissent in Lochner. The
plaintiff in Lamson was an employee whose position painting hatchets became dangerous
when his employer purchased new racks, which tended to drop the hatchets on Lamson’s
head.79 Lamson had earlier complained about his Damoclesan axes, but “was answered,
in substance, that he would have to use the [new] racks or leave.”80
Holmes found that Lamson had assumed the risk of his employment by declining
to exercise his Free Labor right to leave. As Holmes put it, “He perfectly understood
what was likely to happen. … He complained, and was notified that he could go if he
would not face the chance. He stayed, and took the risk.”81 It was critical to Holmes that
he identify, and accept, the hard place Lamson was up against: “He [assumed the risk]
none the less that the fear of losing his place was one of his motives.”82 The choice
between being fired and remaining in what the sketchy facts of the case suggest was an
unreasonably dangerous workplace was a free and self-authorizing one, and the worker
who took the option of staying legally accepted the consequences as well. The threat of
firing was merely the legitimate corollary of the Free Labor right of exit.
The clearest expression of the logic governing these cases came in Leary v.
Boston & A.R. Co.,83 where a plaintiff employed as a laborer was ordered to ride a
locomotive as a fireman, a considerably more dangerous duty than his ordinary job.84 He
sought damages from his employer when he was injured, and was refused. The court
acknowledged that the plaintiff had accepted the dangerous additional duty in the face of
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a threat of firing85 but it was precisely this choice that constituted his assumption of the
risk of his employment.86 Much as Justice Ruffin had done in his steely-eyed North
Carolina opinion, the court recognized the aspect of threat and coercion in the employer’s
presentation of alternatives, but found them legally in-bounds: “To morally coerce a
servant to an employment the risks of which he does not wish to encounter, by
threatening otherwise to deprive him of an employment he can readily and safely
perform, may sometimes be harsh.”87 It is, however, only the practical power created by
the reciprocal rights of Free Labor relations: the employee’s right to sell her labor or exit
and take it elsewhere, and the employer’s right to hire and fire at will. That these
decisions might be taken in hard corners – in conditions of need and with few or no
palatable alternatives – made them no less free according to the courts of Massachusetts,
which found for these purposes that any free employee stood, in the words of the
Supreme Court, “upon an equality” with his employer.

C. The Perennial Problem
The upshot of these cases, then, is that the same problem persists through two
very different legal contexts: the master-slave relationship and the relationship, whether
constitutional or at common-law, of free laborers and their employers. Both regimes are
premised on interrelated definitions of (1) what constitutes legal personhood and (2)
which aspects of human beings may be regarded as property, who may own this property,
and on what terms. In each case, then, a regime of property in human bodies, energy, and
talents comprises both the law of resources and the law of personhood. An essential
function of this legal regime is to define the relationship between these two aspects of
85
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human beings, and two respects in which we may approach one another as resources and
those in which we must respect one another as persons. This work falls to law because
the central terms of the two aspects of property law are not self-defining: what is
personhood and what a resource, and what each of those categories permits and prohibits
in practice, is a matter of interdependent definitions.

II. From Doctrine to History: Resources and Personhood in Early-Modern
Property and Political Economy
Because “personhood” and “resources” are not self-defining terms, the next step
in understanding their shifting significance is to open the investigation to consider the
backdrop of political thought and struggle that framed and informed jurisprudential
change. The law’s shifting designation of certain aspects of human beings as property
and other aspects as bounded by personhood-based principles of autonomy took place
against a backdrop of political and economics thinkers’ attempts to understand slave
economies and free-labor economies as distinct kinds of social orders. Such thinkers
treated labor recruitment and discipline – the management of people as resources – as
among the most important social relations, shaping individual character and political
culture. The logic of these social relations emerged directly from the interdependent
legal designations of people as resources and as persons. Political and economic thought
thus provided a conceptual vocabulary and orienting values that filled out the stakes for
social life of the law’s interdependent definitions of property and personhood. In this
part, I present three such contemporaneous theoretical positions: the critical account of
slave societies as founded a definition of property that implied a degrading definition of
personhood and commensurately degrading social relations; the celebratory account of
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market societies as reconciling human beings’ character as property with their character
as persons by making the sale of one’s own time and talent a matter of formally voluntary
agreement; and the critical account of this pro-market position as an ideological cloak
concealing inequalities of economic power that, when revealed, showed consistent
violations of the idea of equal personhood. These positions comprise the views of
property and personhood at work in the doctrinal discussion of the last Part: the
antebellum courts’ ambivalent attitude toward the human character of slave relations, the
Free Labor courts’ embrace of formally voluntary arrangement as self-ratifying even in
grotesque circumstances, and those courts’ doubts about whether the formal equality of
free bargainers put them “upon a real equality” that properly balanced their usefulness to
one another as resources with their status as legal persons.

A. The case against slavery and feudalism
An initial note: it may seem eccentric to assimilate slavery and feudalism to each
other. The two are often treated separately, in large part because American discussion is
shaped by the experience of New World slavery, with its basis in racial distinction.
Feudalism, as a hierarchical arrangement of social and economic role within an ethnic
community, seems quite a different phenomenon in contrast.88 Participants in the debate
I am canvassing, however, regarded the systems as so similar as to be continuous with
each other.89 They were opponents of slavery and feudalism and advocates of a
88

It is also worth saying that I mean “feudalism” to designate not just the arrangements of early Norman
England or even the Europe of the early Middle Ages, but, generally, a social and economic order in which
stable and marked hierarchy (1) designates fairly specific functions in both the social and economic
spheres, which (2) are interdependent, so that occupying a certain economic position will imply playing a
corresponding social role, and (3) are hierarchical in the sense that certain prerogatives attach to superior
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Richard Hildreth, a prominent campaigner against American slavery, began his discussion of the status of
enslavement in the Old World with a survey of English and Central European villeinage, including both the
outright ownership of persons and the ownership of persons appurtenant to land (serfdom). See RICHARD
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commercial alternative based on voluntary contract, the right of exit, and the free sale of
labor.90 In linking slavery and feudalism, they were classifying both systems by
reference to what I will call the terms of recruitment – the rules by which one may enlist
and govern the activity, in this case the labor, of another. They understood the basic
features of recruitment in slave and feudal societies to be command backed by threat. In
commercial or Free Labor societies, the basic terms were reciprocal negotiation aimed at
free assent. These terms, in turn, produced distinct social relations with consequences for
individual character and political culture.
There was variety in thinkers’ rendering of these themes. In a particularly stark

HILDRETH, DESPOTISM IN AMERICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE, RESULTS, AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE
SLAVE-HOLDING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 177-78 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970) (1854).
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philosophe Denis Diderot described the depredations of slavery in Europe from Athens and Rome through
the long decline of feudal serfdom, then lamented of New World slavery, “But hardly had domestic liberty
been reborn in Europe than it was buried in America.” DENIS DIDEROT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 185-86 (John
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times happier, even in the most despotic empires, than they were formerly in the best-ordered
democracies.” Id. at 186. Adam Smith, too, assimilated feudal and slave relations, remarking in his
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1-1-72 (on the relationship of the ideal of self-ownership and of a commercial society organized on the free
sale of labor and talent to (1) the self-conception of Northern United States society and (2) the Republican
critique of Southern society in the decades preceding the Civil War. For an ambivalent characterization of
the ideology, with a focus on its cost in conceptions of community and civic virtue as well its gains in
liberty and dynamism, see GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 127-57 (describing the views of political economy of
jurist and New York Chancellor James Kent, who endorsed a free-labor conception of American law and
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Michael Sandel’s treatment of the theme, which is pitched at the level of political philosophy as much as at
that of history. Sandel characterizes the emphasis on personal autonomy and voluntary social relations in
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account, the historian and anti-slavery theorist Richard Hildreth described relations
between slaves and masters as founded purely on the threat of violence. In his account,
slavery extended a “state of war” into social life: the master extracted labor from the
slave on the basis of a direct threat to the slave’s life.91 A subtler account came from
Adam Smith, who recognized the possibility of sympathy and reciprocity between
masters and slaves under certain circumstances.92 Nonetheless, Smith’s account of the
slave bond had the same core as Hildreth’s: the master’s prerogative was in principle
absolute, requiring only orders, not negotiation. Mortal threat lurked in the
background.93 On this theoretical account, then, the slave and feudal relations had a pair
of features. First, they were either immediately or ultimately founded on a threat to
survival: a villein or slave obeyed the master’s will in order to live. Second, even where
a legal constraint might stay the master’s hand from actual violence, the master’s
prerogative was such that there was no need to appeal to the material or other interests of
the slave (interests in what I have called prosperity and flourishing) to induce obedience:
command alone sufficed as a legal matter, because the slave had no right to refuse a
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Hildreth wrote, “The relation of master and slave, like most other kinds of despotism, has its origin in
war. By the confession of its warmest defenders, slavery is at best, but a substitute for homicide. …
Slavery then is a continuation of the state of war. … The relation of master and slave, as we may conclude
from the foregoing statements, is a relation purely of force and terror. Its only sanction is the power of the
master; its best security, the fears of the slave.” HILDRETH, DESPOTISM at 35-38.
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Smith was concerned to show that relatively poor societies, in which masters worked at the same
business as their slaves and might share quarters with them, resulted in more sympathy and less brutality
between masters and slaves. He wrote, “[A] North American planted, as he is often at the same work and
engaged in the same labour, looks on his slave as his friend and partner, and treats him with the greatest
kindness; when the rich and proud West Indian who is far above the employment of the slave in every point
gives him the hardest usage.” SMITH, LECTURES at 184-85.
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Describing slavery in the classical world, Smith wrote, “1st, with regard to their lives, they were at the
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so was his liberty at the sole disposal of his master; and indeed properly speaking he had no liberty at all, as
his master might employ him at the most severe and insupportable work without his having any resource.”
Id. at 176-77. Smith was skeptical about the prospects for reform of the institution in the modern world,
proposing that under republican governments, “The persons who make all the laws … are persons who
have slaves themselves. These will never make any laws mitigating their usage; whatever laws are made
with regard to slaves are intended to strengthen the authority of the masters and reduce the slaves to a more
absolute subjection.”
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command.94
It was a major part of the argument against slavery that these terms of recruitment
psychologically shaped both masters and slaves, training the dominant group in tyranny
and the subordinates in abasement.95 Smith contended that masters’ lifelong experience
of giving orders which their subordinates could not refuse structured slave-holders’
preferences so that they came to prize “domination and tyrannizing” over their material
interest in the efficient exploitation of their resources.96 That is, “the pleasure men take
in having everything done by their express orders, rather than to condescend to bargain
and treat with those whom they look upon as their inferiors,” came to be a source of
satisfaction in itself, which masters would not surrender for the mere gains in
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This is an appropriate time to note an inevitable problem in addressing this issue through the thought of
open and committed opponents of slavery in the public sphere – in a word, propagandists. In this respect,
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property law.
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productivity that free labor relations promised.97 Slave and feudal regime seemed to their
opponents both to produce such personalities and to provide a field for the satisfactions
they seek.98 As Hildreth put it, “[h]abituated to play the tyrant at home, unshackled
regent and despotic lord upon his own plantation, where his wish, his slightest whim, is
law, the love of domineering possesses all [the master’s] heart.”99
The arbitrary and absolute relationship to another human being was at the core of
what Hildreth described as an ungoverned Southern planter personality: given to fierce
anger, alcoholism, spendthrift habits – in short, made chaotic by its basic experience of
social relations in which nothing checked the expression of appetite and whim.100 For the
Free Labor theorists, such personalities were incompatible with the rise of commercial
economy: the irregular and domineering Southern character was ill-suited to the steady
and self-denying habits of accumulation and production that Hildreth and others saw as
key to the rise of industry and commerce in place of slave agriculture.101 Tyrannical
personalities were also ill-suited to a conception of democratic society that required a
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measure of mutual regard toward one’s fellow citizens and a willingness to pause, to
listen, to debate, and to compromise.102

B. Commercial society as a property regime: new terms of recruitment
The anti-slavery and anti-feudal position I have been exploring was also a promarket or pro-capitalist position. Adam Smith was famously a prophet of the market
regime, and has been lionized and vilified, in that capacity.103 Abolitionists, too, were
partisans of Free Labor, understanding the voluntary sale of energy and time on a labor
market as the antithesis of prerogative and threat”104 In endorsing commercial society,
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For a splendid evocation of this idea, see David Bromwich, Lincoln and Whitman as Representative
Americans, in DEMOCRATIC VISTAS: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 36-52, at 47
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For a hostile account of the relationship between abolitionism and markets, see GEORGE FITZHUGH,
CANNIBALS ALL! OR SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 217-19 (C. Vann Woodward, ed.) (1960) (1857) (“The
whole morale of free society is, ‘Every man, woman, and child for himself and for herself.’ … Christian
morality is the only natural morality in slave society, and slave society is the only natural society. … In
such society it is natural for men to love one another. The ordinary relations of men are not competitive
and antagonistic as in free society; and selfishness is not general, but exceptionable. … Man is not
naturally selfish or bad, for he is naturally social. Free society dissociates him, and makes him bad and
selfish from necessity.”). Versions of this anti-industrial and anti-commercial note, sounded still as a
North-South battle, persisted at least as late as I’ll Take My Stand, the 1930 collection of broadly antimodern essays by the so-called “Vanderbilt Agrarians.” See, e.g., Lyle H. Lanier, A Critique of the
Philosophy of Progress, in I’LL TAKE MY STAND 122-154 (1930). Lanier wrote of the “unsalutary
psychological and social consequences of the diminution of agriculture upon the general patterns of
American life” and warned of an “unsavory sequel of industrialism” in social degradation. He urged, “If
there exists any effective social and political intelligence in the country it might profitably be mobilized for
the conduction of a specific program of rehabilitation of the agrarian economy and the ‘old individualism’
[broadly civic republican] associated with it.” Id. at 153.
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the critics of slavery and feudalism meant to embrace several interlinked values,
including the dignity of labor, opportunity and mobility, and idea of the equality of
persons – and, of course, the increase in social wealth that Smith seminally argued
followed from the operations of markets.105 To varying degrees these were directly
connected with their central analytic idea in their account of markets: market relations
were terms of recruitment, rules for enlisting the labor and talents of others. As noted
earlier, the property rule that owned one’s own labor and could sell it freely at retail but
not become wholesale the property of another meant that to recruit another’s labor, one
had to negotiate, to appeal to the interest and self-conception of the other. The
negotiation might, of course, take place in profoundly unequal circumstances; but it could
no longer be formally a matter of prerogative.
What was the consequence of inevitable negotiation? Smith, a theorist of moral
psychology as well as a jurist and political economist, provided a particularly rich
answer. He believed the taste for domination over others arose from legal arrangements
that made domination possible by authorizing some to treat others as the mute
instruments. In Smith’s description, such masters scorned “to condescend to bargain and
treat with those whom they look on as their inferiors and are inclined to use in a haughty
way.”106 The use of “bargain and treat” inevitably suggests Smith’s famous reference to
the human “propensity to truck and barter.”107 That is what the master scorns to engage
in and seeks to avoid in his recruitment: bargaining with others, that is, negotiating with
them.
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What did bargaining mean for Smith? He explained in the Lectures on
Jurisprudence that “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” was “founded [in] the
natural inclination every one has to persuade.”108 He continued,
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is
in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is in his interest.
Men always endeavour to persuade others to be of their opinion even when the matter is
of no consequence to them. … And in this manner, every one is practising oratory on
others thro the whole of his life.—You are uneasy whenever one differs from you, and
you endeavour to persuade [him] to be of your mind … . In this manner [people] acquire
a certain dexterity and adress [sic] in managing their affairs, or in other words in
managing of men … . That is bartering, by which they adress [sic] themselves to the self
interest of the person and seldom fail immediately to gain their end. The brutes have no
notion of this … .109
Giving this passage complete exposition would require presenting Smith’s
account of the social “passions,” or what we would call social psychology, in the Theory
of Moral Sentiments.110 Without that excursion, let us take the main ideas Smith offers
about negotiation. First, persuasion, the effort to bring other minds in line with one’s
own, is one of the basic activities of human life; people are motivated to persuasion for
its own sake, not just instrumentally. Second, bartering is persuasion directed at interest:
in bartering one makes a case to another about the content and implications of her selfinterest. Self-interest is not fixed but a matter of self-interpretation, which others may
induce one to revise. Third, sustained practice of persuasion can make it a central
element of character.
Engaging in persuasion has several implications for the way one conceives of
oneself and others. First, it means being aware of living in a world of other persons, each
108
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with her own interests and her own self-conception, including goals, aversions, and bases
of dignity. Second, it means recognizing the relativity of one’s own interests and selfconception to those of others. Announcing your own purposes without considering how
they fit or clash with others’ interests and self-conceptions will all but guarantee that your
purposes – so far as they depend on the persuading other to join you in them – will go
unachieved. To live in a world where cooperation requires negotiation is to inhabit a
social world, where one must be aware of interdependence with others who are as much
persons as oneself.
This is not to suggest that persuasion must produce compassion or genuinely
egalitarian sentiment. A skilled manipulator is as apt to succeed at persuasion as a fairminded sympath – perhaps more so because of the instrumental clarity of his vision.111
What this exposition does suggest, however, is that the satisfaction of wreaking one’s
will on others – the satisfaction of the tyrannical character that views people as things –
will not fare well in a world where persuasion is necessary to recruit labor. When the
terms of recruitment rest on legal reciprocity, one probably cannot expect robust social
and emotional reciprocity to emerge in consequence; but successful recruitment will tend
to require at least the appearance of respect and concern for the interests and selfconceptions of others. When Smith remarks that “brutes have no notion” of the form of
sociability founded on persuasion, one wonders whether he is not referring to slavemasters and feudal lords as well as to the violent African monkeys whose squabbling he
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The vision of market societies as producing skilled manipulators is of course a part of the concern of
anti-modern critics such as Fitzhugh. See FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS.
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describes to make his point.112 The awareness of and responsiveness to others that
persuasion requires is, in the normative sense of humane, a humanizing trait.113

C. The critique of capitalist recruitment: formal and substantive voluntarism
The argument that market persuasion increases sympathy and reciprocity has been
dogged from the beginning by a pair of critiques, one conservative, the other from the
left. Critics of both camps reject the picture of labor markets as inducing voluntary and
reciprocal recruitment.
The critique from the right is communitarian. It proposes that market actors come
to regard one another exclusively as sources of profit (or other selfish satisfactions).114
Conservative critics contrast markets with traditional forms of life that allocate social and
economic roles so that each person and class has a part to play.115 Living in such a
society means identifying with one’s role and learning to honor others in keeping with
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their status in, and contribution to, a shared way of life.116 Although such a society may
not treat people as nominal legal equals, it creates substantive reciprocity by teaching to
value others according to their place in the social whole.117 By contrast, market relations
respond only to individual self-interest and thus train people to regard others as they
would fungible resources: as opportunities to maximize their own satisfaction. 118 On
these grounds, conservative critics claim that in market relations one learns to regard
others entirely as resources, and only oneself as person with morally important purposes.
They have thus defended feudalism, stable agrarian communities, and even slavery as
morally superior to markets.119
From this perspective, market advocates are mistaken when they describe feudal
and slave relations as resting on an ultimate threat to survival or bodily integrity. Their
mistake is projecting into traditional societies the market view of persons as selfinterested individualists. Indeed a self-interested individualist might agree to work as a
serf or slave only in the face of a threat to survival, because her only motive would be her
subjective well-being. In an actual traditional society, the argument goes, the situation
would be very different: social superiors and inferiors would understand their respective
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See FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS at 216-17 (“Especially … is it true with slaves and masters that to ‘do as they
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healthier, more valuable, grateful, and contented. Obedience, industry, and loyalty on the part of the slave,
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common feelings and self-interest dictate to all that it is their true interest ‘to love their neighbor as
themselves,’ and ‘to do as they would be done by’ – at least, within the precincts of the family.”).
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See FITZHUGH supra n. 104 (attack on “laissez-faire”).
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See id.
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For a hostile but often informative survey of these tendencies in thought, see STEPHEN HOLMES, THE
ANATOMY OF ANTI-LIBERALISM (1993) (claiming common motives and objections to modernity among
fascists, romantics, and political and philosophical communitarians). Another deeply hostile account that
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ed.) (1998); Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 91-174 (Henry Hardy, ed.) (1991).
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prerogatives and duties as expressing a meaningful social order, and their roles would
express substantive reciprocity.120
I think that this line of argument typically reflects either reactionary romanticism
or a frantic casting-about for any weapon with which to assault markets. The versions
that celebrate traditional hierarchy are morally irredeemable. The versions that eschew
such reactionary fantasies and concentrate on the alleged depersonalizing effects of
markets are not odious, but are at best nostalgic for a form of reciprocity that likely never
existed.121 In any event, this conservative critique has little influence on American law.
The last major expression of status-based solidarity was Justice Taney’s originalist
endorsement of a white-supremacist conception of citizenship in Dred Scott v. Sandford.
That alone is suggestive evidence that we are better off without this way of thinking.
The critique from the left, however, deeply influenced the Lochner-era
jurisprudence of constitutionalized economic relations that I described in Part I by
providing the concern about what counts as “a real equality” among bargainers. This
critique concentrates not so much on the reciprocity on the voluntarism of market
relations, which it attacks as merely formal and seeks to replace with substantive
voluntarism. The nub of this critique is that, in market societies, the choices people make
in accepting or declining offers of recruitment – chiefly employment, but also other
invitations to joint action – are constrained in ways that belie their advertised
voluntarism. This argument is neatly captured in Anatole France’s famous remark on
formally equal legal status: the law alike forbids rich and poor to sleep beneath the
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bridges of Paris.122 Depending on the allocation of wealth and other resources (such as
acquirable skills and knowledge), nominally free bargainers may find themselves
choosing between one very bad alternative and several abominable ones, with the very
bad choice effectively enforced by the implicit threat of having to move on to one of the
abominables. The point of such an argument is to dispose of the glib libertarian claim
that formal voluntarism alone makes social relations “free,” and to focus instead on the
distribution of resources that frames bargaining circumstances.
This criticism is intelligible from the perspective of any person who must choose
among better or worse options, and may reasonably ask, Why these options? Why must I
choose between lousy and worse, when others, by virtue of the allocation of wealth (and
perhaps other resources) choose among versions of splendid and fine? Why call our
choices free in just the same sense, when in mine I feel deeply constrained, and that lucky
other person feels genuinely free in his?
In this part, I have presented the arguments in political economy that formed the
backdrop to the doctrinal problem that opened the article: how to draw the line between
human beings’ character as resources and their character as persons. I have shown that
concern with the terms of recruitment drove theorists’ conceptions of feudal, slave, and
market societies. The practical question that focused the theoretical problem in the
doctrinal discussion of the first part was the limits of labor discipline: how might one
person recruit and retain another’s effort, and where did her power to induce or coerce
cooperation end? This part has shown that this question was thought to have sweeping
theoretical consequences for the character of social life and of its members. In the next
part I bring together these doctrinal and historical discussions in a theoretical account of
122
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the features of human life that make the problem of recruitment perennial and place it at
the nexus of property and personhood: the thoroughgoing interdependence that coexists
with our autonomy.

III. The Analytics of Interdependence and Recruitment
As noted at the beginning of the article, the resources-based account of property
law begins from a description of the world in which law operates: a world of scarce and
desired resources. Similarly, the personhood-based account begins from a description of
the human nature with which law interacts: the nature of a species for which continuity of
experience and the capacity to see one’s will and self-understanding instantiated in the
external, physical world are essential sources of identity.123 Here I explain how human
beings are both bearers of personhood and scarce and desired resources for one another’s
ends, and thus how a property regime that addresses the recruitment and discipline of
people must incorporate mutually dependent definitions of both what is a resource and
what constitutes personhood.

A. The Sources of Autonomy and Interdependence
Human beings have a dual nature.124 We are resources for one another: our
talents, training, time, energy, our minds, bodies, and even feelings are necessary to
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See generally works of Margaret Jane Radin cited in n.13, supra.
Thinking of human beings as having a dual nature – as objects of causal forces and as subjects of action,
as the creatures of their circumstances but also the makers of those circumstances, as resources for others
and as ends in themselves – has its modern point in origin in Immanuel Kant’s account of the perspective
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academy, the most influential expositor of an explicit dual-nature theory is Roberto Unger. See ROBERTO
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advance others’ projects. We need one another. We are susceptible, literally, to
exploitation. Moreover, we are scarce as well as desired resources:125 of all the schemes
and wishes in human minds, from making money to making art to making love, only a
small fraction will ever be realized. Those who invent or adopt these projects need – and
mostly fail – to recruit others as investors, co-venturers, employees, or lovers. Our
wants, dreams, and self-images are hostage to our success or failure in recruiting others to
them.126
At the same time that we are resources, means to one another’s purposes, we also
each have our own purposes, wishes, and ends. Indeed, we recognize one another as
“ends,” other purposeful and self-conscious beings owed a duty of reciprocal
forbearance.127 This concept is a cornerstone of modern law and ethics, whether it is
rendered as Kant’s characterization of persons as ends in themselves,128 rights theorists’
specification that each person carries the same complement of basic powers and
immunities,129 the utilitarian axiom that the pleasures and pains of each shall count

the cultural, economic, and political contexts in which they are born and as agents capable of seizing
opportunities to revise these contexts and thus remake their world and themselves).
125
The definition of a valuable resource as one that is both scarce and desired comes from RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW sec. 3.2 (2d ed., 1998).
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The poet W.H. Auden wrote in his Elegy for Sigmund Freud, “To be free is often to be alone.” Auden’s
formula, however bleak, captures only half of the unhappiness in our situation. To be alone is also to be
unfree, in the sense of being unable to realize any of the aims that depend on the recruitment of others. By
‘free” Auden intended a psychoanalytic aim: to act without illusion or neurosis, the compulsive repetition
of or return to the source of some developmental trauma. The concern of Article is to say something about
how law, and specifically the law of property, might make it more nearly possible to be free and yet not
alone, free among others.
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This phrase, and not a particularly Kantian conception, is all that I mean by “ends” in this article. I
mean it as synonymous with the qualities captured in the term “personhood.”
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For an account of this position, see J.B. Schneewind, Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of
Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT 342-66 (Paul Guyer, ed.) (1992).
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The late Robert Nozick is probably the best-known modern rights theorist. See generally ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (outlining a theory of social justice on the basis of an
account of natural rights). For a treatment of rights-based arguments in general, including Nozick’s, with
special concern for the law of property, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 62-105
(1988) (detailing the structure of rights-based arguments in general).
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alike,130 the contemporary economist’s commitment to revealed preference as the sole
evidence of interests,131 or the principle of equal protection under law.132 Each such
account of persons places some limits on how we may recruit one other to our purposes:
respectively, under rules that pass the strait gate of the categorical imperative, consistent
with their basic rights, consistent with the greatest happiness of the greatest number, by
means of their voluntary accession to our effective demand, or within the bounds of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore the governing conception of personhood, freedom,
dignity, or equality does much to determine the set of human purposes that will be
achieved in any social order. This connection works through the terms of recruitment:
how you may enlist others to your projects selects those projects that reach fruition.
Both our usefulness to others as resources and our status as ends deserving others’
forbearance have histories. Technological and economic history describe our changing
character as resources: how we have become relatively less valuable in one aspect – for
instance, as agricultural laborers – and more in another – say, as designers of video
games or, more generally, practitioners of “symbolic manipulation.”133 The history of
culture, politics, and religion has substantially to do with how ideas of the distinctive
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For an account of the power and limits of the utilitarian position that remains more or less
contemporary, see J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM; FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (in which
Smart presents the argument that the right is determined by the greatest good of the greatest number and
Williams argues the contrary, although not in favor of any specific alternative).
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It is not an entirely conventional view that the methods of neo-classical economics reflect a commitment
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respect. For an account that gets at this idea, see AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 7-13, 19-25,
510-12 (arguing that both a plausible account of persons as bearers of preferences and the market
commitment to protecting their liberty to act on the preferences they hold incorporate recognition of the
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132
See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AM. XIV (“No State shall … deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
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I do not mean to claim that everything that is called “property” must be best described by the account I
am giving here. It strikes me as naïve and artificial to suppose that a sprawling and historically complex
area of law would prove magically all to have the same hidden form – a kind of realist recapitulation of
Langdellian doctrinal essentialism. If, however, I can describe a good deal of what property law does in
terms of a distinctive and persuasive account of specific and important features of social relations, that will
help to illuminate both what property law does and what we might want it to do that it does not do now.
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value and importance of human beings have changed over time.134 In any time and place,
our terms of recruitment reflect the interaction between these two domains.

1. The taxonomy of dependence:
I earlier pronounced that we are valuable to one another and are thus susceptible,
literally, to exploitation. I will now give more specific content to this claim. We need
others for a variety of purposes, which we cannot accomplish without their assistance.
What we need may be affirmative contributions or may take the form of forbearance. We
need one another to survive, to prosper, and to flourish. Each of these terms designates a
set of purposes, widely held and highly valued, to which one may appeal in seeking to
recruit others to her projects. The first step in understanding the idea of terms of
recruitment is to appreciate these distinct aspects of our reciprocal dependence.135
We need one another to survive. That is, we are physically vulnerable animals,
and in consequence we depend on one another’s protection and forbearance – especially
those of stronger individuals – for our continuing lives. To “recruit” a person by
appealing to survival is to make an offer he cannot refuse. This is the alternative
presented to the targets of recruitment in at least three settings: forced labor in
authoritarian societies, enslavement, and the feudal compact. Come work with me – in
whatever capacity – goes the offer, and I will not kill you, nor will I let others kill you.136
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See works cited in n.21, supra.
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It is not implausible that the majority of the recruitment of human effort throughout
history has been in these terms.
We need one another to prosper. For our material well-being, we depend on
opportunities to engage in productive activity and to consume the fruits of that activity.
With the exception of primitive forms of cultivation and gathering, we produce wealth
cooperatively and consume what others have produced. Recruitment that appeals to this
aspect of interdependence says, “Come work with me, and you will have more” –
measured in whatever the target of recruitment wants – “than you otherwise would.”
This is the signal appeal of market society. This is how we are accustomed to solicit one
another in the labor market, the market for capital (“give me your money, and you will
enjoy higher returns than you otherwise would”), and, if one believes certain explanations
of human behavior, in the “markets” for marriage and sexual gratification.137
We need one another to flourish. We need the cooperation of others in
intrinsically fulfilling ways of being or becoming what it is we wish to be. At least two
distinct branches of flourishing require the recruitment of others. One is vocation, the
search for a defining, usually productive activity in which we feel ourselves expressed,
augmented, or improved.138 Another is love, the non-instrumental relations to other
people in which we exercise and develop compassion and generosity; come through
reciprocal recognition to understand our own experience and personality more fully or
clearly than we otherwise could; and, within the relative safety of intimacy and trust, can
revise our character by taking chances with new modes of desire, expression, and
should have died, typically as a result of defeat in war, but also as a result of poverty. His physical life was
spared” at the price of the total alienation of his freedom. Id. at 10.
137
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) (arguing throughout that sexual and romantic behavior
can be explained by the aim of maximizing sexual gratification relative to a variety of exogenous
constraints).
138
See TAYLOR, SOURCES, supra n. 21 at 211-47 (on “the affirmation of ordinary life,” the Protestant
development of the idea that in social life and work – including vocation – people approach the divine as
nearly as is possible in this world).
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activity.139 The appeal to flourishing proposes, “Join me, and you will be more fully
yourself than you could otherwise be.”
Different types of interdependence can be nested within the same appeal.
Survival is the limit condition of the appeal to prosperity, the boundary at which the
person recruited is choosing between a recruiter’s offer and starvation.140 Appeal to
flourishing will, for the fortunate, be compatible with choosing an attractive bundle of
“prosperity” goods; that is the position, for instance, of relatively well-compensated
writers, artists, and scholars.141 It is not too wild-eyed a generalization to suggest that
most people give considerations of flourishing relatively greater weight to the extent that
they believe these considerations are compatible with acceptable choices along the
dimension of prosperity. In a very rough sense, then, the three purposes – survival,
prosperity, and flourishing – are nested in the order in which I have presented them, with
survival inmost. (This is too simple, of course: aesthetes, spiritualists, and others may
well choose flourishing over prosperity and even over survival.)

2. The terms of recruitment
This taxonomy of interdependence describes the needs that law confronts. In
defining personhood and resources in human beings, law both responds to and shapes our
interdependence.
Law does this in two ways. First, it sets rules of recruitment. These specify
139
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See PATTERSON, FREEDOM supra n.15 at 9 (noting that the basis of slavery is historically the exchange of
freedom for the sparing of one’s life, either in war or in the face of starvation).
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For a discussion of different motives in and attitudes toward productive activity, see UNGER, SOCIAL at
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relatively stable or intelligible social order; instrumental, or enabling one to survive for other satisfactions,
but not fulfilling in itself; and as a transformative vocation, work that “connects self-fulfillment and
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Id. at 29.
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which forms of dependence one may appeal to in recruiting others, and in what ways.
For example, one basic rule of recruitment forbids recruiting people by means of threats
to their survival. Despite the fact that we depend on one another’s forbearance and
protection for survival, private individuals may not threaten to withhold that forbearance
– that is, threaten to kill another – to recruit her. Second, by allocating claims on
resources, law sets the circumstances of recruitment, the framing facts of wealth and
poverty that substantially determine the relative bargaining positions of the parties to
recruitment. Together these dimensions of law make up what I have been calling the
terms of recruitment, the combination of legally constituted facts of ownership and the set
of legally permissible combinations of inducement and threat one may use in recruiting
others.
I will develop the account through a brief exposition of the thought of Robert Lee
Hale, the Legal Realist and institutional economist who gave the classic statement of
property law as making up terms of recruitment, and then show how my formulation
moves beyond his. Hale described what I have called the circumstances of recruitment
this way: “The law confers on each person a wholly unique set of liberties with regard to
the use of material goods and imposes on each person a unique set of restrictions with
regard thereto. The privileges, rights, and duties of each person differ from those of
every other person.”142 Hale’s emphasis on the uniqueness of each person’s rights and
duties under property law expresses an emphasis not on the abstract categories of the law
– the forms of ownership, for instance, which define the several bundles of rights over
things that people may hold143 – but on the concrete social world in which each person is
the owner of certain resources and not of others. Recruitment takes place against this
142
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distributive background, in which each person’s starting point is unlike every other
person’s.
Building on this account of bargaining, Hale describes economic life as a system
of mutual coercion among all participants. Hale’s innovation is to concentrate on (1) the
power of exclusion that attends most forms of ownership144 and (2) the threat effect of
proposing to exercise the power of exclusion against other individuals who need your
resources to pursue their projects of survival, prosperity, or flourishing. This description
amounts to an inversion of the conventional account of market relations as comprising
voluntary exchange for mutual advantage, which highlights instead (1) the power of
alienation or transfer and (2) the inducement to another to become better off by
consummating an exchange. 145 To that inducement, Hale contends, there corresponds the
threat of non-consummation, of sticking at exclusion and denying the other the benefit of
your resources. The point of Hale’s shift of focus is not that owners want to exclude
others from their resources, but that they want to exact the most favorable terms of access
from others who need their resources, which the threat of exclusion enables them to do.146
On this account, the allocation of resources essentially shapes the threats one party may
make against another, that is, the consequences of enforcing the power of exclusion: if
both parties are relatively well endowed, the cost of being excluded from the other’s
resources – put differently, the opportunity cost of declining a proffered bargain – will
not be so difficult to absorb; if, however, one party is so poorly endowed as to need the
144
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resources at issue, while the other party is well enough endowed to be relatively
indifferent to the outcome of the bargain, then the poorer party will be subject to
significant coercion.147 It is important to underscore that even in a situation of great
inequality, the coercion is mutual: the propertyless worker exercises coercion over the
factory owner in declining to work; it is simply a weaker coercion that what the factory
owner exercises in refusing to pay the non-compliant worker.148 On Hale’s account,
“coercion” represents not a judgment about the balance of power in a specific transaction,
but the elementary term of description for economic life as a system of coordination
based on the balance of threat.
Hale’s account of property relations as reciprocal coercion is neither falsifiable
nor verifiable. It is a rhetorical choice intended to highlight certain aspects of
transactions that can also be described in Paretian terms of mutual benefit or libertarian
terms of voluntary exchange. That is not to say, however, that Hale’s description has no
implication for the assessment of property regimes. Rather, by concentrating on the
circumstances of recruitment, Hale sought to shift the meaning of “voluntary”
relations.149 The libertarian jurisprudence that Hale attacked in his pre-New Deal
writings arose from the constitutional “right of contract” and common-law Free Labor
position discussed in Part I. That jurisprudence concentrated on formal voluntarism,
characterizing as free nearly any transaction undertaken without threat of violence,
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blackmail, or some other “overt” coercion.150 This was not an empty, merely nominal
voluntarism: rather, it concentrated on the rules of recruitment, albeit to the near-total
exclusion of the circumstances of recruitment. In this view, the fact that a bargainer had
to choose between one highly disadvantageous option and several truly dreadful
alternatives would not make the resulting transaction less voluntary, so long as it was not
exacted under a bodily or other direct threat.151
Hale’s descriptions of the various quanta of threat that different parties could
bring to their recruitment efforts shifted the focus from formal to substantive voluntarism,
attention to the range of viable alternatives each party confronted and the costs and
benefits associated with each. Hale showed the implausibility of simply blessing as
“voluntary” a labor contract resulting from the encounter of the worker’s very small
coercive power (the very small threat of his withholding his labor) with the very great
coercive power of the employer (the very great threat of withholding employment).152
Having taken Hale as the exemplar of attention to the circumstances of
recruitment, I now want to move beyond his position. Hale’s description of economic
life as a system of mutual coercion revealed a great deal; but it also obscured the
importance of the rules of recruitment. Hale took of market society’s rules of recruitment
as given and set out to show that they were not enough to secure economic freedom.
Ironically, then, even as he redescribed markets as systems of unequal power, Hale
inadvertently naturalized the basic terms of market relations, in which certain threats –
appeals to certain dimensions of interdependence – are out of bounds.
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Yet to do this slights the moral achievement of market rules. It is no minor fact
that under the laissez-faire law that Hale attacked, recruitment could not involve threats
to survival. That prohibition was not ideological legerdemain, although Hale seemed to
suggest the contrary. As discussed in Part II, it was the moral core of a law of
recruitment that arose in direct repudiation of slavery and feudalism.153 It was for this
reason that Free Labor thought also included an idea of democratic community. In
contrast to the white-supremacist vision of citizenship that Chief Justice Taney had
expressed in Dred Scott154 and the “mud-sill” theory that social life depended on a
degraded class of workers who did society’s demeaning work, Free Labor contended for
a different conception of personal dignity and social membership.155 The heart of the
idea was that honest labor under conditions of equal opportunity (1) meant a fair chance
for all (2) was dignifying in itself. No one was condemned by birth to inferior status;
instead everyone had a shot at becoming a person of substance.156
The question Hale might have asked, had he taken a different direction, was not
just what was false in the Free Labor promise to reconcile our character as resources with
our character as persons, but also what would be necessary to make it true. Addressing
this question requires at least steps that Hale did not take. One is to give the rules of
recruitment equal standing with the circumstances of recruitment, as an historically
varied and contested effort to give effect to ways that we regard human beings as
mattering morally. The other is to ask, normatively, what is the best potential in one’s
own tradition of understanding the relationship between resources and personhood? In
the next part, I propose a normative orientation that emerges from the historical
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developments I have surveyed. This orientation concentrates first on maximizing
reciprocity in recruitment and second on maximizing appeals to considerations of
flourishing.

IV. A Normative Orientation: The Analytics, Tradition, and Prospects of
Reciprocity
What should be our terms of recruitment, and why? I argue that the normative
touchstone that emerges from the discussion so far has two aspects: first, maximizing
reciprocity, relative equality in interdependence and thus in recruitment; and second,
increasing the share of recruitment appeals that speak to the axis of flourishing rather
than survival or prosperity. As in earlier portions of this paper, I offer several
complementary modes of argument. First, I lay out a feature of the contemporary legal
and policy landscape that presents the prospect of a gain along these normative
dimensions. Second, I present a two-part analytic account of these dimensions,
concentrating specifically on how recruitment proceeds under relatively reciprocal and
flourishing-oriented conditions. Third, following the earlier discussion of political
culture as providing the conceptual backdrop to law, I describe a tradition in American
political thought that fills out the ideas of reciprocity and flourishing: a view of
democracy as an ongoing exercise in persuasion.
Before I speak more specifically to the normative implications of my argument so
far, I want to pause over the word “normative.” I take it that the arguments of this Article
catch its audience mid-stream in the sense that it addresses them in light of the
commitments they already hold.157 I have no ambition to persuade readers who are
157

This is in contrast to a polar pair of views. The first is that it is possible to produce normative principles,
and arguments vindicating them, whose authority is independent of the starting point of the arguers. For a
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determinedly unmoved by appeals to freedom and reciprocity. Rather, my argument
addresses (1) the best understanding of what it means to be committed to freedom and
reciprocity and (2) the implications of that commitment where it is properly
understood.158 I have presented an account of how law interacts with changing
technologies and values on the one hand, and permanent facts about interdependence on
the other. The aim of this account is to show how changing terms of recruitment can
change the concrete terms of interaction, generating either greater practical capability and
wider choices or lessened capability and narrowed options. For those who already accept
the goodness of freedom and reciprocity, concurring with my description should have
two kinds of implications. First, it should affect the evaluation of property regimes by
drawing attention to the terms of recruitment that they establish.159 Second, it should
affect the conception of freedom itself by emphasizing its relational character and its
constant tension with the interdependence that is the basis of our interwoven need for and
vulnerability to one another.

A. Prospects: Margin of reciprocity at two edges of the modern world
relatively minimalist, up-to-date, and secular version of this view, see JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION
19-111 (Ciaran P. Cronin, trans.) (1993) (describing
and defending an ethical theory based on the structure of communication). The second is that normative
assessment is irremediably subjective and insusceptible to rational elaboration that persuades beyond what
the arguers already believe. See Gilbert Harman’s portion of GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON,
MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996).
158
This approach to normative argument is consistent with the broadly “hermeneutic” account of Charles
Taylor: while we cannot hope altogether to escape the context of attitudes and concepts from which we
reason, we can clarify and expand our beliefs and, in doing so, transform them in what we take to be the
direction of greater insight. See CHARLES TAYLOR, 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS : HUMAN AGENCY AND
LANGUAGE105-112 (1985) (so arguing). I believe this mode of argument is also compatible with the
concept of democratic persuasion that I describe in TAN ___-__, supra.
159
Among reforms that might fare well under this standard are those I discuss in Jedediah Purdy, A
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273,
1266-84 (2005) turning informal possession of real property into formal title; creating sophisticated riskpooling markets that effectively commodify the expectation of good fortune and high earnings (and thus
hedge against their opposites); and ensuring widespread access to the technologies of cultural production
and voluntary peer production. In the third Article in this series I intend to take up the program of assetcreation as a concrete way to explore a freedom-promoting view of recruitment regimes.
AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS
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There are many places to begin a discussion of how changes in the terms of
recruitment can move in the directions of reciprocity. One might begin with land titling
programs for urban squatters in developing countries, which appear to increase labormarket participation by reducing the monitoring cost of household security, and may thus
set in motion the pressure toward gender equity that the data from India reflect.160
Alternatively, one might look to innovative programs such as proposed risk-sharing
markets in the earning power of sectors of specialized training, which by permitting
voluntary spreading of the risk to specialization might increase real freedom to choose
unconventional courses without merely subsidizing eccentricity.161 I have discussed both
of these examples elsewhere. Here I take up two very different cases, one set in the
developing world, the other on the frontiers of technology. The first concerns how
women’s participation in labor markets affects their power to negotiate decisions in the
household, and how changing proportions of interdependence in these spheres express
themselves in the valuation of females both as resources and as persons. The second
addresses the rise of voluntary modes of non-hierarchical production in technologically
advanced areas of cultural production, which present new possibilities for appeals to
flourishing in recruitment. Taken together, they suggest the breadth of application of the
theoretical model I have developed here.

1. Reciprocity in markets and households: resource value as personhood value

See generally Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism (Basic 2d ed 2002)
(arguing that Peru’s poor represent a distinct entrepreneurial class); Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (Basic 2000) (arguing that
capitalism fails in poor countries because the poor lack property rights in their assets).
161
See generally Robert J. Shiller, The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century (Princeton 2003)
(proposing a new risk management infrastructure that utilizes financial inventions to insure the gains made
by workers).
160
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One of the more striking and troubling symptoms of the differential value human
beings place on one another is the sex asymmetry among children and young adults in
East and South Asia. Better known as the problem of “missing women,” the
phenomenon now comprises some hundred million young men and boys in excess of the
corresponding female populations in India, Pakistan, China, Taiwan, and neighboring
countries.162 Although scholars offer competing accounts of the causes behind the
asymmetry, no one seriously disputes that one major cause is that sons are culturally
more valued than daughters in the countries where the asymmetry has developed.163 This
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See VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 59-66 (2004).
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There is considerable debate on the relative proportions of gender disproportion caused by each of a
variety of factors. One class of factors expresses a preference for sons over daughters, exercised at
different points in the cycle of conception and childhood: sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and
preferential caregiving and medical expenditures resulting in higher levels of childhood mortality in girls
than in boys. For an outline of the debate over proportions among these causes, see Junhong Chu, Prenatal
Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural China, 27 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REV.
No. 2 at 259 (June 1, 2001) (observing that many Western observers were skeptical that sex-determination
technology was widely available in China, while Chinese scholars resisted the suggestion that post-natal
sex discrimination or infanticide caused the sex disparity). Today it is clear that China’s domestic
production capacity makes possible widespread sex-determination technology, and reported levels of sex
ratio at birth show such a dramatic disproportion that any post-natal addition to the ratio must be regard as
additional, not supplanting. See infra TAN __ - __. Another candidate is inaccurate reporting: some
suggest that births of girls are underreported, either because of low cultural valuation of females or
because, under China’s one-child policy, parents who wish to have a son may conceal the birth of a
daughter in an effort to avoid enforcement of the policy. For a discussion of this question, see Dudley L.
Poston & Karen S. Glover, Too Many Males: Marriage Market Implications of Gender Imbalances in
China at 8-10 (unpublished paper: on file with author). As Poston and Glover note, however, Taiwan’s sex
disproportion at birth approaches China, despite near 100 percent reporting and no legal constraint on
fertility, making underreporting seem unlikely to explain the bulk of China’s sex ratio. See id. at 9.
Moreover, although reliable studies of the nominally illegal practices of prenatal sex-determination and
sex-selective abortion are difficult to come by, Junhong Chu’s study of one village in which she had earned
the trust of participants showed high levels of both practices. See Chu, supra (this note) (reporting 39
percent use of ultrasound sex testing during first pregnancies, 55 percent use in second pregnancies, and 67
percent use in additional pregnancies; 27 percent of respondents reported at least one abortion, and 86
percent of that group reported at least one sex-selective abortion). A third candidate is, paradoxically,
improving health overall. Many more male than female fetuses are conceived, but because female fetuses
are hardier than males, the natural proportion at birth only slightly favors males. Hence, other things equal,
an improvement in the health of pregnant women, which decreases the rate of fetal wastage (miscarriages
and stillbirths) should increase the proportion of male fetuses. For this argument, see Dhairiyarayar Jayaraj
& Sreenivasan Subramanian, Women’s Wellbeing and the Sex Ratio at Birth: Some suggestive evidence
from India, 40 J, DEVELOPMENT STUD. No. 5, at 91 (June 1, 2004). Although attractive for its note of
optimism (perhaps not all news of sex disproportion is bad news!) and for its application of medical insight
to social inquiry, this explanation cannot go far. The world’s richest countries, where fetal wastage rates
are presumably much lower than in India or China, do not even approach the sex disproportions registered
in those countries. In short, it is very difficult to get away from the conclusion that sex-selective abortions
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differential valuation contributes to sex-selective abortion to eliminate female fetuses and
greater spending on medical care and nutrition for boys.164 In consequence, fewer girls
than boys are born, and fewer of those survive to adulthood. My interest here is not in
this very important demographic problem per se, but in taking sex differentials in survival
as a statistical expression of the differing personhood value placed on girls and boys. By
aggregating the results of hundreds of millions of family decisions, these numbers reveal
who counts in the marginal decisions of families often on the edge of privation. They
also suggest when and how the valuation of personhood changes.
Essential indicators of development, such as male literacy, average income,
urbanization, and access to medical care do not reduce the sex asymmetry; on the
contrary, they sometimes correspond to growing sex gaps.165 Although perhaps
unsettling to anyone inclined to believe in a unified theory of progress, these facts are
unsurprising on the assumption that families prefer sons over daughters. The effect of
increases in basic development is to enable people to effect their will in more ways than
they could otherwise do.166 Wealth and medical resources increase opportunities to have
sex-selective abortions by making the necessary procedures accessible and affordable; so
does the access to information about medical procedures that literacy brings. Apart from
this direct means of enforcing the preference for sons, increased household wealth may
For one account of the significance of differential valuation of sons and daughters in this phenomenon, see

VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S
SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 131-32 (2004).
164
a start on the dispute, see HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra n. __ at 112-13. One study of a hospital in Punjab

in the 1980s and 1990s found that 13.6 percent of mothers of boys admitted – with reticence which may
suggest underreporting – having undergone pre-natal sex-selection; the comparable figure was 2.1 percent
for mothers of girls. The other female fetuses presumably were not carried to term. See id. at 112.
165
See AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 197 (1999).
166
This is a shorthand statement of the theory, associated with Amartya Sen, that freedom should be
measured parlty in capabilities, i.e., the range of human potential that people are able to realize in their
lives. Sen has developed this position in many essays. See Goods and People, at 509 in Resources, Value,
and Development, supra n. 66; Markets and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 501 (2003);
Opportunities and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 583; Freedom and the Evaluation of
Opportunity, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 659; and passim in AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM
(1999).
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increase overall childhood survival rates, yet also increase the survival gap if a
disproportionate share of the increase goes to investments in the health of boys.
The picture becomes more complicated, though, if one disaggregates the family,
asking whether the preference for sons is common to all members or enforced by
husbands, and, if the latter, under what conditions women might enforce contrary
preferences. In addressing the problem this way, it is helpful to adopt Amartya Sen’s
description of families as sites of “cooperative conflict.”167 In this model, the various
members of a family hold partly overlapping and partly conflicting interests and values,
which, taken together, produce a single “solution” for the family’s use of resources.168
Any solution includes both a set of priorities and an effective, usually informal set of
decision-making procedures for setting or balancing priorities.169 A solution may be
either relatively egalitarian or inegalitarian, either in its weighing of the preferences of
various family members or in the role it gives each member in decision-making
procedures.170 A family is thus, among other things, a site of negotiation over the terms
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See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM at 192-93. . For a particularly helpful discussion and elaboration
of Sen’s model, see BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE’S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN
SOUTH ASIA 53-81 (1994).
168
See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM at 192-93; AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE’S OWN at 53-81.
169
See both sources cited in immediately previous footnote.
170
As Bina Agarwal points out, the variables that figure here are not just control of resources, but also
cultural ideas of which issues are at stake in negotiation and which are so clearly settled as to be off-limits
to bargaining. See AGARWAL, supra n. __ at 73-75. Another important variable is which conditions
women perceive as “problems” (whether or not open to negotiation) bearing on their well-being or that of
their children, and which are accepted (preceding even the question of negotiability) as untroubling. Sen
has emphasized the importance of an idea of false consciousness in this connection, suggesting that
experience of empowerment reveals interests previously obscure to the interest-holder. See SEN, The
Possibility of Social Choice, 65, 90-92 in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM (2002); Martha Nussbaum, Charles
Taylor: Explanation and Practical Reason, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 232-41 (Nussbaum & Sen, eds.)
(1993). Others have argued that the poor are always in some measure aware of their disadvantage, and
simply require practical opportunities, not enhanced insight, to challenge it. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT,
WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985). Although I tend to follow Sen
and Nussbaum in believing that exposure to new experiences and ideas can revise one’s estimation of one’s
interests – and that to believe the contrary would be more condescending than even a crude “false
consciousness” view – the present argument does not require a judgment on this point. Increased capacity,
or substantive freedom, is open to interpretation as either a source of insight into one’s interests or an
instrument for pursuing and enforcing interests already recognized. On reasons to believe that selfunderstanding frames any negotiating process, see CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN
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of cooperation, conducted among people who address a complex and interwoven set of
one another’s needs for survival, prosperity, and flourishing.171 What happens when the
relative balance of dependence changes in the negotiation of family decisions?
There is provocative evidence that when women’s bargaining power increases,
survival rates for girls rise relative to those for boys. That is, the family’s decisions
become more sex-egalitarian as women increasingly enforce egalitarian or pro-female
preferences. Specifically, two variables correspond to reduced sex inequality in
childhood survival rates: women’s literacy and women’s participation in the
workforce.172 These are, of course, indicators of development in general; but they are
also, specifically, indicators of how much women have participated in the benefits of
development.
These data suggest that something in these particular changes enables women to
enforce greater concern for daughters than male-dominated households evince. That is,
certain kinds of women’s development, although they operate mostly in the public setting
of the market, redound to the household by improving women’s bargaining position.
This improvement marks an increase in reciprocity within the household, a reciprocity
that enables women to enforce their preferences in the negotiation that produces the
family’s “solution” in cooperative competition. It figures, in other words, in the ongoing

SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2 at 34-37 (arguing for the place of self-understanding in constituting
activity such as politics or negotiation) (1985).
171
Families, that is, pool resources for relative prosperity and provide forms of protection that increase
bodily security and integrity. Just as important, they provide intimacy and forms of complex and ongoing
interpersonal recognition – which may be on terms ranging from quite reciprocal to highly non-reciprocal.
172
See ALAKA MALWADE BASU, CULTURE, THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR,
ILLUSTRATED WITH THE CASE OF INDIA 160-81 (1992) (surveying and interpreting findings to this effect
from India and elsewhere, including Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa). Basu notes that, while sex
ratios in child hood survival improve with both variables, maternal employment is sometimes associated
with reduced overall rates of childhood survival, most likely because of the sacrifice of direct caregiving
implied by the decision to work outside the home, particularly for families on the edge of survival. See id.
at 170-73.
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reworking of terms of recruitment, and thus of cooperation, among profoundly
interdependent people.
How might the enforcement of women’s preferences improve the personhood
status of females in household bargaining? One picture would imagine that women have
a constantly sex-neutral or pro-female concern for their children, which increasingly
control of resources enables them to insist upon. In this model, control of material
resources, above all bringing wages into the household, would appear to be the most
significant change. Literacy would figure chiefly as instrumental to employment.
Women might spend their own wages to care for their daughters, threaten to withhold
money if a husband demands a sex-selective abortion, or use the possibility of economic
self-reliance to threaten exit in a high-stakes dispute over a household decision.173 These
examples correspond to distinct and complementary conceptual possibilities:
respectively, personal control over resources contributed to household expenditure;
ability to withdraw resources from the household pool; and the possibility of exit without
privation or material dependence on extended family, which of course makes possible the
credible threat of exit even for those who do not really wish to exercise it.
One might also take a more dynamic view of the relationship between women’s
control over resources and their preferences. Perhaps the economic status of women is
connected with their self-regard and their estimation of their daughters’ prospective lives
so that they do not simply enforce pre-existing preference as their bargaining power
grows, but develop increasingly egalitarian preferences as their experiences and
173

The reference, of course, is to ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). For his part, Sen notes “considerable evidence

than when women can and do earn income outside the household, this tends to enhance the relative position
of women in the distributions within the household.” Id. at 194. He also suggests that literacy and
education make women aware of alternatives and give them some confidence in insisting on the legitimacy
of their desires. Id. at 198-99. The phenomenology of these suggestions is of mixed voice and exit, which
seems right.
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capabilities grow.174 Where women work outside the home, the result is a new set of
everyday interactions, experiences of competence, and resulting expectations, all
redounding to the sense of agency in oneself and to one’s idea of how other women’s
lives might be lived.175 Literacy, too, broadens awareness of possible lives, both those in
existence elsewhere and those that might be in one’s own setting.
The problem I have described begins from a differential valuation of female
personhood, a judgment enforced at the level of the family that girls and women matter
less than males. Increases in agency or capability at the family level seem not to
diminish the problem. What does make a difference is women’s power to assert value as
resources, measured in the labor market, in the negotiations that form the family’s
cooperative conflict. In a striking historical continuity, the critical institution in this
change, the labor market, is the same that figured so centrally in the early-modern liberal
account of how changes in the rules of recruitment could make the resource and
personhood dimensions of human beings mutually reinforcing. At least in the family’s
internal negotiations, relative to the same negotiations where women’s resource value
counts only in the domestic or other informal economy, that liberal forecast seems to
174

This is a kind of moral-psychological corollary of the growing recognition that women’s agency is a
critical factor in economic and social development, not merely in the passive sense that it makes women
bearers of greater quanta of well-being, but in the active sense that women’s empowerment contributes to
development processes that affect both women and men. This thesis is the thrust of the discussion in SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM at 189-203. For a recent summation of arguments and data supporting this
view, see Isobel Coleman, The Payoff from Women’s Rights, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May – June 2004)
(“Educated women have fewer children; provide better nutrition, health, and education to their families;
experience significantly lower child mortality; and generate more income than women with little or no
schooling. Investing to educate them thus creates a virtuous cycle for their community”).
175
See AGARWAL, supra n. __ at 421-66 (describing in several case-studies as well as theoretically how
struggles over resources are also “struggles over meanings,” that is, over what women’s and men’s interests
are and how they should count. “Struggles” should be underscored: women’s increasing control of
resources has often resulted in both violence and a recrudescence of male-supremacist politics. See id. at
271-76 (describing such reactions). The view that changes in economic structure and opportunity and
changes in individual values go hand in hand appears to find confirmation also in the decline in native-born
white American fertility rates around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which prompted pro-natalist
warnings of “race suicide.” Summarizing historians’ views of that period, Linda Gordon concludes, “The
economic reorganization that made smaller families more economical also made upper- and middle-class
women eager for broader horizons, which in turn made them desire smaller families.” See LINDA GORDON,
THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 100-01 (2002)
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come true in developing countries today. Moreover, there is reason to speculate that the
change is dynamic, and that women in the workforce – particularly literate women –
come to value their own and other women’s personhood more highly than before, so that
the preferences they insist upon are partly the fruits of the same changes that increase
their bargaining power within the family.
I do not mean to overlook the extent of suffering and injustice in both the labor
markets and household in the developing world, nor would I want to portray participation
in an often merciless private economy as a simple experience of emancipation. That
would recapitulate the too-simple optimism of Free-Labor ideologues, who brought a
once- emancipatory idea into the service of justifying harsh and practically unequal
economic relationships. Nonetheless, the power of controlling a disbursing a resource in
oneself is real and considerable, and to the extent that it creates reciprocity in other
spheres of life, it makes possible a relatively egalitarian idea of personhood, that is, of
how and why people matter.

2. Appeals to flourishing in the production of culture and knowledge
I now move to a very different setting. Yochai Benkler has recently argued that
digital technology has changed the capital structure of the production of culture and ideas
in ways that create new opportunities for substantive voluntarism.176 The backdrop to
this thesis is a mostly unexamined claim that, under conditions of industrial production –
particularly the necessity of concentrated capital, with the factory as the exemplar – the
governors of modern economies opted for rules that promoted maximum productivity:
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See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality
of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004); Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political
Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003). More specific citations to both articles accompany the
following discussion.
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allocation of resources by markets and management of productive relations through
hierarchically organized firms.177 (By “unexamined,” I do not mean to suggest that
Benkler is naïve; rather, he sets aside the question whether the judgment that these rules
were the ones best suited to maximizing productivity was meritorious or ideological, and
does not treat the political process by which the rules were formed.) Those rules had the
incidental effect of inhibiting substantive voluntarism, just as critics of market relations
contended.178 The burden of Benkler’s argument is that, even assuming the
appropriateness of this earlier decision, new technologies make substantive voluntarism
potentially compatible with maximum productivity.
Benkler’s analysis concentrates on several technological phenomena. One is the
proliferation of productive capital on a scale appropriate to individual ownership, in
packages that routinely include substantial excess capacity.179 The model is the personal
computer, which typically holds much more computing capacity than its owner uses at
any time. (Other goods that have the excess-capacity feature, although they are not
“productive capital,” include automobiles and backyard swimming pools.)180 The heart
of Benkler’s argument is that, in many circumstances, voluntary sharing of this excess
capacity may be a lower-cost way of deploying it than use of a pricing scheme; moreover,
it may result in uses that are just as socially productive. Benkler offers as examples
schemes in which computer users turn over their excess capacity for large-scale
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See Benkler, Freedom at 1247-48 (“An underlying efficient limit on how we can pursue any mix of
arrangements to implement our commitments to democracy, autonomy, and equality … has been the
pursuit of productivity and growth. … [W]e have come to toil in the fields of political fulfillment under the
limitation that we should not give up too much productivity in pursuit of these values.”
178
See id. at 1248 (“Efforts to advance workplace democracy have … often foundered on the shoals – real
or imagined – of these limits, as have many plans for redistribution in the name of social justice. Marketbased production has often seemed simply too productive to tinker with.”).
179
See Benkler, Sharing at 275-81 (designating as “lumpy” those capital goods that typically come in
packages that include excess capacity and as “mid-grained” those whose scale encourages widespread
personal ownership).
180
See id. at 281-89.
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computational, mapping, and other tasks which are more cheaply performed by many
networked units than by a single mega-unit – particularly where the first alternative is
given gratis.181
From the example of networked computers, Benkler moves by a clever (but
mostly implicit) analogy to suggest that people, like their laptops, frequently hold excess
productive capacity relative to what the market induces them to sell: we have free time
and unused talent. The same technology that makes possible the networking of otherwise
unused computing capacity to achieve more than a single production unit could do
permits voluntary combination of talents and energy to productive ends.182 Benkler’s
favorite examples are free, open-source software; the wikipedia, a collaborative
encyclopedia; and Slashdot, a collaborative news-and-commentary compendium for
techies.183 These are significant technological and cultural products, generated by the
voluntary and decentralized coordination of talents and energies not otherwise demanded
by the market. Although Benkler is deliberately agnostic as to the motivation that leads
people to this work, it is not much of a stretch to suppose that some part of it falls along
the axis of flourishing: self-expression, the development of a sense of vocation, even
play.184
Network technology makes these collaborative productions possible, turning
many who might have been solitary hobbyists into participants in social production.
Another technological innovation gives complementary advantage to substantive
181

See id. at 289-96 (describing the efficiency advantages of distributed computing).
See Benkler, Freedom at 1256-60 (discussing voluntary, loosely collaborative “peer production”).
183
See id.
184
Benkler goes so far as to say, “Capturing the potential for human action that could be motivated by the
exchange of love, status, and esteem, a personal sense of worth in relations with others, is the strong suit of
social production … . Social production rewards action either solely in these forms or, if it adds money,
organizes its flow in such a way that it at least does not conflict with and undermine the quantum of selfconfidence, love, esteem, or social networking value obtained by the agent from acting.” Benkler, Sharing
at 328 (citations omitted).
182
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voluntarism. This is the diminution in the cost of capital necessary to produce culture.
Video, music, and books are now relatively inexpensive to create and costless at the
margin to reproduce, facts that threaten the industrial-model gatekeepers of culture with
obsolescence.185 In a sense, this situation promises to return cultural production to the
craftsman ideal that attracted both left-wing and right-wing critics of industrial market
production: independent creation by people who control their own productive capital and
thus can operate outside hierarchical firms (if not outside market imperatives).186 Record
companies, publishing houses, and the film industry all played the role of factories: when
production and reproduction of culture required concentrated capital, those who wanted
to live by creating had to go through them. Now that may cease to be true, or at least
may diminish in its force and categorical character.

B. The Analytics of Reciprocity
In a previous article, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property,187 I urged
evaluating property regimes by the level of human freedom they produce, where freedom
is conceived of as capabilities in the manner Amartya Sen has advocated. Attempting to
avoid the pitfall of complete uninformativeness, I proposed that priority be given to (1)
capabilities relating to the satisfaction of basic needs and (2) meta-capabilities, those that
enable people to acquire still other capabilities or to revise their framing circumstances,
whether individually (through, say, skills acquisition or therapeutic insight) or

185

See Benkler, Freedom at 1252-54 (discussing the character of information as “nonrival,” a quality now
attaching to cultural goods that can be electronically reproduced and transmitted as mere information);
Benkler, Sharing at 349-51.
186
For a discussion of this idea, see Ian Shapiro, Resources, Capacities, and Ownership: The Workmanship
Ideal and Distributive Justice, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 21-42 (John Brewer & Susan
Staves, eds.) (1996).
187
See Purdy, supra n. 15 at 1292-94.
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collectively (for instance, through political participation).188 The first criterion amounts
to a variant on classical utilitarianism in that it proposes a metric that supposes something
like diminishing marginal returns from command of resources as one’s purposes move
from the essential to the elective.189 The second criterion runs in the direction of a liberal
conception of positive freedom: it makes a priority of those capabilities that enable one to
determine one’s own activity and character, but does not stipulate the forms they should
take.
This Article has developed two points with major implications for thinking about
the relationship of property regimes to freedom. The first is the importance of
understanding freedom relationally, in two senses. On the one hand, our capabilities
reflect not just resources we control as individuals (from currency to charisma), but our
power to recruit others, without whom major aims along all dimensions – survival,
prosperity, flourishing – will go unrealized. There are therefore significant limits on any
capabilities-based understanding of freedom that does not give attention to the rules and
circumstances of recruitment. On the other hand, ideas essential to filling out any
relational conception of freedom have histories in which law, culture, politics, and
technology interact. What threats and inducements may we direct at one another? Which
purposes are so important that we must be protected in them, either by prohibition (so
that the value of life rules out threats to survival as recruitment devices) or by guarantee
(so that everyone enjoys access to a public domain, or cultural commons of words,
images, and music from which to furnish their own expressive activity)? The answers to
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See id.
Abandoning this view was an important move in the change from utilitarian to formal Paretian accounts
of efficiency, as well as the move to a substantive wealth-maximization criterion. Both moves surrender
the assumption even of weak interpersonal comparability of utility. For a discussion of some of the
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these questions implicate views of people as ends: how we matter, which qualities make
us important and entitled to respect. The vitality, even the plausibility of these ideas,
however, depends in part on whether they are expressed and reinforced in the terms of
recruitment, so that in our social relations we conceive of and approach one another in
keeping with conceptions of personhood that are compatible with whatever normative
idea of the person we nominally embrace.
The chief distinction I propose is between reciprocal and non-reciprocal
dependence. Which one it is will have major consequences for the terms of recruitment.
The slave relationship is founded on non-reciprocal dependence for survival: you can kill
me, but I cannot (with any roughly even level of confidence) threaten to kill you; so I
accede to your recruiting offer.190 By contrast, the Hobbesian social contract, forged to
avert the war of all against all, rests on reciprocal dependence for survival: all of us are
threats to each of us, unless and until we enter a compact designating a single authority to
govern our relations.191 While liberal, market society (not alone, but prominently) has
eliminated this recruitment appeal, much of the politics of that society concerns the
balance between reciprocal and non-reciprocal dependence for prosperity, that is, along
the axis of need. The core of Hale’s critique of formal voluntarism was insistence on the
importance of this distinction: if you can withhold from me resources that I badly need,
such as access to industrial capital to make my labor productive, then your threat is much
more significant to me than is my threat to you to withhold my labor.192 If, however, I
enjoy access to capital of my own (such as digital technology), have a wide set of
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alternative ways to meet my needs and wants (because of broad skills or some
endowment in material resources), or can withhold labor collectively to tilt the bargaining
position in favor of myself and others in my position, then our interdependence may be
more nearly reciprocal. Along the axis of flourishing, too, the arrangements people make
may reflect either reciprocal or non-reciprocal dependence. The identity of the
slaveholder, the meaning of his life – and not only his prosperity – depended on nearly
unqualified domination of other persons. Making this form of identity and vocation
impossible was a signal aim of early-modern pro-market reformers.193 The selfunderstanding of wealthy patrons in a service economy may be a mitigated version of the
same form of personality. In intimate relations, both erotic satisfaction and the forms of
identity that interweave with it have long been deeply shaped by non-reciprocal
dependence, particularly the dependence of women on men (debatably biological in some
dimension of its origins but pervasively and violently socially enforced in any case). One
aim of the continuing struggle over gender relations is to make possible genuinely
reciprocal foundations for our entreaties to love and recognition.
The historical trajectory of critique, reform, and renewed critique toward further
reform that this Article has sketched follows a single arc: the incremental replacement of
non-reciprocal forms of dependence with reciprocal forms. In each episode, successful
reform requires three elements. One is material conditions that make a change in relative
dependence possible, for instance, by increasing the overall social surplus that is up for
contest (as the rise of industrial production did) or changing the capital structure of
production in ways that affect bargaining positions (as digital technology has done in the
production of culture and knowledge). Another is ideological or cultural recognition of
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the possibility of change: the insight that non-reciprocal dependence is now an artifact of
human arrangements, not natural necessity, and a proposal as to why a different
arrangement would be better. The pro-market program I sketched earlier was one
instance; the proposal to link substantive voluntarism with democratic political economy
is another. Third is a program of institutional action that can concretely change the
circumstances of recruitment, the rules of recruitment, or both. Such programs range
from the Thirteenth Amendment to minimum-wage laws to guarantees of access to
cultural material for purposes of low-capital creative activity. In other words, to
understand the potential for reform in any setting, one must be able to say something
about (1) how people in that setting are valuable and necessary to one another as
resources; (2) how they respect one another as ends; (3) how either of these might be
open to change; and (4) what program of reform could promote changes now possible but
as yet unrealized. An increase in reciprocity is likely to be neither a pure artifact of
political will nor a sheer bequest of changed material conditions, but rather the product of
moral and institutional imagination exercised at the intersection of objective possibility
and deliberate choice.
Why should seizing opportunities for increased reciprocity in recruitment be an
appropriate goal for reform of property regimes – and correlatively, why should
reciprocity be an attractive metric for evaluating property regimes? Our ideas of people
as ends give substance to such concepts as fairness, justice, and freedom. These ideas
have histories rather than essences, and correspond – if that is the word – not to eternal
facts but to social practices, institutional forms, and legal rules. Therefore, it may be
productive to conceive of our relationship to fairness, justice, and freedom as a dynamic
one. This would mean asking not whether we are approaching more closely to these
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standards, understood in a fixed and absolute sense, but rather by what process we are
forming and reforming our understanding of what these standards entail. This would be
to conceive of the meaning of personhood as indeterminate, but influenced in distinct
ways by our concrete social relations. Specifically, in seeking to enlist others in our aims,
do we bring to bear outright coercion, the subtle and problematic coercion of need and
constraint, or the more difficult and multifarious appeal of persuasion? So far as our
conditions of dependence, and consequently our terms of recruitment, are reciprocal,
persuasion will occupy a greater place in our appeals. We would then have to pose our
particular view of human purposes – or just of our own purposes – as founded not on
prerogative or privilege, but on and only on their power to win the energies, the talents,
even the devotion of others.
The point of reciprocity, then, is not simply that it is just or makes people more
free. It is just, as measured by important expressions of that idea, and it does make
people more free in many relevant respects; but my discussion draws attention to a
specific consequence of reciprocity in dependence and the terms of recruitment.
Reciprocity makes everyone free to engage with the meaning, purposes, burdens, and
hazards of freedom, to participate by experiment and persuasion in its continuing and
open-ended definition. This alone goes some distance toward emancipating some from
the need to accede to others’ ideas of human purpose just to get by in the world, because
they depend for survival, prosperity, or flourishing on those others. It also helps in
freeing all from the grip of inherited ideas about human value and purpose that have
persisted only because those who bear their cost have lacked the chance to resist them
and shape alternatives.
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C. Analytics II: Recruitment under Relative Reciprocity
How ought we to understand the potential of reciprocity in the terms at the core
of this paper, the relationship between our character as resources and our character as
ends? The most powerful and credible account involves a specific relationship between
individual autonomy and democratic culture, and provides a glimpse of what a
“democratic economy” might be. This idea appears in fragments in scholarly discussions
of decentralized and voluntary production, but no one has drawn together the strands or
shown how these ideals of democracy and autonomy require a specific mode of
recruitment if they are ever to be made good. Diagnosing this idea in the peer-production
setting offers an image of what it might mean generally.
All the criticisms of formal voluntarism in favor of substantive voluntarism share
recognition of a basic – probably willful – confusion in Adam Smith’s characterization of
market relations as free and reciprocal.194 The offer of a shilling is not an exercise in
persuasion. 195 It is of course an appeal to interest, and the very fact of the appeal carries
the concession that was so important to the early defenders of markets: that people must
be recruited by winning their assent, not by wresting it bodily from them. As Hale
recognized, however, in offering a shilling, one proposes to win the other’s assent by
appeal to her wish to avoid deprivation – at the limit, absolute deprivation. 196 (Naturally,
once one has a sum of money, one may do all sorts of things with it that go well beyond
avoiding starvation. These will be in one’s mind in accepting or rejecting a money offer.)
Moreover the appeal to need is not really an interpersonal one: with the prices of all
resources set by market aggregation, the worker knows both what his labor is worth and
how much he must earn to satisfy basic needs and non-basic wants; all bargaining
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proceeds in the matrix of market pricing, so that a recruitment appeal to one individual’s
need is in a real sense just an instance of a general calculus of need. The participants are
from this perspective fungible features of the system.
How might this change where an economy takes on some of the qualities Benkler
identifies: diffusion of productive capital; an increase in the economic value of unique
rather than fungible human capital, such as creativity, aesthetic or ethical judgment, or
broad and synthetic knowledge; and increasing opportunities to participate in non-market
production motivated by desire for the esteem of peers, consonance with one’s own
values, or self-expression?197 The critical difference will be in the type of recruitment
appeal likely to be most effective. Consider, for instance, how an entrepreneur in a peerproduction scheme will appeal to contributors whose music, essays, digital videos, or
other products he wishes to solicit. How will he distinguish himself from any other
would-be impresario of the peer-production world? First, he cannot do it by simple
capital accumulation, because his mode of production is premised on widely distributed
productive capital; where a factory owner can distinguish himself in bargain by the fact
of controlling a major piece of capital whose concentration is necessary to industrial
production, that advantage is not available here.198 Second and relatedly, whatever
appeal he makes will have to take account of competition from other entrepreneurs with
similarly low capital-based barriers to entry. Third and more speculatively, in recruiting
non-fungible, creative resources, he may have to consider a dynamic relationship
between the manner of the recruitment and the quality of the product: more dramatically
than in the case of replicable physical tasks, the quality of creative products reflects the
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state of mind of the creator. A grudgingly composed sonnet, symphony, or screed, absent
certain perverse forms of genius (Both O. Henry and Douglas Adams were reportedly
locked in hotel rooms to induce them to finish their best work), will likely reflect the
resentment of the creator more vividly and consequentially than a grudgingly completed
SUV oil-change or sheetrocking job.
A part of the recruitment appeal under substantive voluntarism, then, may be
precisely to the self-understandings of the recruited participants: their estimation of what
in their activity and in the larger world gives meaning to their lives. This type of appeal
is familiar from advertising and branding, that is, appeals to people as consumers rather
than producers.199 It is standard in those areas to appeal to people’s ideas of who they are
or would like to be: progressive and environmentally conscious shoppers at Whole Foods
supermarkets; discriminating and upscale diners at Babbo, Chez Panisse, or Per Se; sleek
and athletic wearers of the Nike Swoosh; bumptious and aggressive drivers of Hummers;
and so forth. 200 In the recruitment of people as producers it is a commonplace that the
pleasantness of the work, which may include short or flexible hours or some more basic
compatibility with the tastes of prospective worker, is part of the compensation. The
effect of the shift I am imagining, however, would be to increase the importance of this
aspect of recruitment, even making it central to the recruitment appeal.
This would mean tilting recruitment away from the need-prosperity axis and in
the direction of the flourishing axis, whose chief appeals are those of vocation and love:
join me, and you will be more yourself than you would otherwise be.
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V. Conclusion
We need one another, and this makes us valuable to one another. It also makes us
dangerous to one another. To make good our purposes, plans, and wishes – to body forth
our personhood – we must recruit the time, effort, even the beliefs and sentiments of
others. We are one another’s hostages and one another’s completion.
This often painful paradox in human life produces one of the essential tasks of
law, and particularly the law of property: defining the boundary between those respects in
which people must approach one another as persons, and those in which they may lay
claim to one another as resources. I have shown the interaction of these two inextricable
dimensions of human activity in legal doctrine, the framing debates of political and
economic thought, and a novel theoretical account of interdependence and autonomy. I
have also argued that quite disparate aspects of contemporary life present opportunities to
seize a margin of reciprocity in our inevitable relations of recruitment, and thus to make
interactions more free and appeal to flourishing – our own ideas of how and why we
matter – more prominent.
The meaning of our personhood has no fixed and permanent form. At least a part
of that nature consists in our capacity to pose the question, “What should I do?” and to
understand the answer as a matter of right and wrong, better and worse. Our nature as
resources has led us constantly to override this capacity in others, to win them to us by
open or subtle threat, not by free judgment and assent. In ordering our relations to one
another as resources – what I have called our relations of recruitment – by principles of
reciprocity, we redress the mutilation that our nature as resources has visited over and
again on our nature as ends. By making persuasion the means of winning over others, we
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partly redeem the universal capacity of freedom, the power to ask the question whose
answer lies in conceptions of freedom, of human value and purpose: “What should I do?”
An economy and social world may be called freedom-promoting in the measure that it
makes the answer to this question the touchstone of the other question we are always
addressing together: “What shall we do today?”

74

